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INTRODUCTION
Mandatory drug testing programs have a lot more to do with de-
fending anti-drug cultural norms by espousing homilies than with
serious analysis of employee productivity. . . . The question is
whether there is a substantial fit or match between the perceived
problem and the proposed solution.'
The question . . . is not whether drug use, off-duty or on-duty is
incompatible with ... employment. Rather, the question is by what
means is it permissible to come by evidence of such drug use.
2
The use of intoxicants3 is a practice at least as old as civilization.4
The people of the United States have a long history of intoxicant
use.5 Efforts to control the distribution of intoxicants within the
United States predate the Constitution. 6 Most efforts to control in-
toxicants in the United States have focused on controlling the supply
of particular intoxicants. 7 Despite these efforts, the use of illegal
1. Wisotsky, The Ideology of Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 763, 767 (1987).
2. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp.
726, 735 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (emphasis in original).
3. The terms "intoxicant" and "substance" will be used interchangeably
throughout this Note. They will be used to indicate all types of chemicals, legal and
illegal, that could be labeled drugs. These terms will include over-the-counter drugs
such as aspirin and alcohol, as well as illegal drugs such as cocaine and heroine. In
short, the terms will encompass any chemical that may, in some manner, affect an
individual's psychological, emotional, intellectual, or physical functioning.
4. Cahannes, Trends in Alcohol and Drugs on the International Market, 11 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 501, 501 (1982) (advocating international agreements on trade in alco-
hol). See generally Note, Religion: The Psychedelic Perspective: The Freedom of Religion De-
fense, 11 AM. IND. L. REV. 125 (1983) (discussing the historic use of psychedelic
substances in American Indian religious ceremonies).
5. See W. RORABAUGH THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIc 5-20 (1979). Rorabaugh de-
scribes the drinking habits of Americans in the period between 1750 and 1850. The
attitude of the period is best reflected in the words of one New Englander:
There's scarce a Tradesman in the Land,
That when from Work is come,
But takes a touch, (sometimes too much)
of Brandy or of Rum.
Id. at 26. See also Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug
Trafficking and Organized Crime, March 1986 Report to the President and the Attorney
General, 187-258 [hereinafter America's Habit] (describing the history of drug abuse
and prevention in the United States).
6. See RORABAUGH, supra note 5, at 67-68. These efforts included an excise tax
on rum and molasses. To mollify rum distillers, a tax was also assessed on whiskey.
Id.
7. See Heath, A Chronicle of Federal Drug Enforcement, DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Decem-
ber 1980, at 6. The entire issue chronicles government prohibition and regulation of
various intoxicating substances, from early regulation of opium through the prohibi-
tion era to 1973. See also America's Habit, supra note 5, at 187-258.
The Commission on Organized Crime suggested that efforts needed to be made
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substances has increased in the last twenty-five years. 8
In March, 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime
suggested a new tactic: controlling the demand for drugs.9 A corner-
stone of this demand-side control was the Commission's recommen-
dation that employers randomly test employees for the use of illegal
substances.10 After announcing a campaign against drugs, President
Reagan signed an executive order designed to facilitate the institu-
tion of mandatory urinalysis substance screening of all federal
to reduce the demand for drugs. Id. at 431-37, 482-86. The use of urinalysis screen-
ing reflects a new approach in the efforts to control illegal drugs: demand-side con-
trols. As a part of the effort to reduce the demand for drugs, the commission
recommended that:
[T]he President should direct the heads of all Federal agencies to formulate
immediately clear policy statements, with implementing guidelines, includ-
ing suitable drug testing programs, expressing the utter unacceptability of
drug abuse by Federal employees. State and local governments and leaders
in the private sector should support unequivocally a similiar policy that any
and all use of drugs is unacceptable. Government contracts should not be
awarded to companies that fail to implement drug programs, including suit-
able drug testing. No Federal, State, or local government funds should go
directly or indirectly to programs that counsel "responsible" drug use or
condone illicit drug use in any way. Laws in certain States which
"decriminalized" the possession of marijuana constitute a form of such con-
donation, and should be reconsidered.
Id. at 483.
As part of the effort to reduce the demand for illegal drugs, President Reagan
signed an executive order instituting mandatory testing of federal employees. Min-
neapolis Star and Tribune, Sept. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Reagan said that the federal
workplace should be "a model" for the campaign against drugs. Id.
8. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 42 (1985).
See Lead Report, Drug Screening by Sports Employers Reflects Emerging Pattern of Testing, 4
EMPLOYEE REL. L. WEEKLY (BNA) 387, 387 (March 31, 1986). While this is attributa-
ble to a wide range of factors, it is also true that there are simply more illegal drugs
today than 1776. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Wisotsky, Exposing
the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305,
1310-14 (discussing the hysteria that led to legislation criminalizing the non-medical
possession of cocaine). See generally Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56
VA. L. REV. 971 (1970) (historical reasons for the criminalization of marijuana);
Cahannes, supra note 4, at 501-02 (intoxicants are now available virtually anywhere,
at virtually any time).
In 1962, about four percent of the population had used illegal substances. Note,
Jar Wars: Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMET'E L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1987). A
1982 National Institute on Drug Abuse study estimated that in the month before the
survey, 100.2 million Americans consumed alcohol; 20 million, marijuana; 4.2 mil-
lion, cocaine; 2.8 million, non-medical stimulants; 1.6 million, non-medical sedatives;
1.1 million, non-medical tranquilizers; and 1 million, hallucinogens. Alcohol & Drugs
in the Workplace: Costs, Controls, & Controversies, SPECIAL REPORT (BNA) at 11 (1986)
[hereinafter Alcohol & Drugs].
9. America's Habit, supra note 5, at 431-33, 463, 482-86.
10. Id. at 483, 485. The purpose of the proposal was to reduce the financial
resources of organized crime. Id. at 5-13.
1988]
3
Smith: To Test or Not To Test: Is That the Question? Urinalysis Substanc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA IV REVIEW
employees. I I
Nationwide, employers are subjecting employees to urinalysis sub-
stance screening with increasing frequency.12 The testing of em-
ployees and prospective employees is not a new practice,13 but the
addition of urinalysis substance screening to the battery of tests
given is both recent14 and controversial.15 This controversy has re-
11. The President and Nancy Reagan announced the campaign on September
13, 1986. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Sept. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1. President Reagan
announced the executive order two days later. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Sept. 16,
1986, at 1, col. 1. See also Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
12. Lead Report, supra note 8, at 387; Gampel & Zeese, Are Employers Overdosing on
Drug Testing?, Bus. & Soc'y REV., Fall 1985, at 34. Nearly 25% of the Fortune 500
companies screen employees for drug use. Companies using screening programs in-
clude Burlington Northern, I.B.M., Boise Cascade, American Airlines, General Mo-
tors, Storer Communications, and the New York Times. See also Hartsfield, Medical
Examinations as a Method of Investigating Employee Wrongdoing, 36 DEF. L.J. 251, 251
(1987). Minnesota employers using screening programs include: the Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, see Rubenstein, Worker Drug Screening to Get Legal Test, MINN. L.J. Mar.
27, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Domino's Pizza, see Twin Cities Reader, July 1-7, 1987, at 12,
col. 1; and Stone Container, Id. at. 13, col. 1. Screening has also given rise to a new
black market- "clean" or "drug-free" urine. Id. at p. 13, col. 2-3. Prospective tes-
tees can get black market urine in any form they want: powdered, frozen, or "the real
thing." Id.
Employers are utilizing screening in two contexts: random screening, and "for
cause," or "incident-driven" screening. The second is not particularly controversial.
No one is arguing that employees have a right to be intoxicated on thejob. The first,
however, is highly controversial. In random screening, either all employees, or em-
ployees chosen at random are subjected to screening. Throughout this Note, the
word "screen" indicates a test that is used to determine substance use by an individ-
ual employee.
13. Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect Privacy, 13 J.
LEGIs. 269, 269 (1986). Testing methods include polygraphs, see infra notes 181-82
and accompanying text, intelligence tests, personality profiles, and physical exams.
Although each test has a specific purpose, generally the tests are used to increase the
efficiency of present employees or to weed out potentially bad employees.
14. Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Work Place: Balancing Employer and Employee
Rights, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 181, 182 (1985). The technology developed in 1980 by
the Syva Company lowered the cost of a urinalysis test from $50-100 per sample to
about $5 per sample. See Note, supra note 13, at 273. It is this reduction in cost that
has made mass urinalysis testing possible. Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Em-
ployee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451, 1455-56
(1986). See also McBay, Efficient Drug Testing: Addressing the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REV.
647 (1987) (problems arising from sudden increase in drug testing).
15. See, e.g., Hill & Dawson, Discharge for Off-Duty Misconduct in the Private and Public
Sectors, ARB. L.J., June 1985, at 24-25 (employer's right to monitor off-job conduct
unclear); McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War
on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453 (1987) (privacy violated by drug testing); Miller,
Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General
Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 201 (1986) (employees
paying high price for drug testing); Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set For a Dramatic
[Vol. 14
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suited in a flurry of legislationl6 and litigation.17 This activity has
Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, Nat'l L.J. April 7, 1986, at 1,
col. 1 (drug testing does not address real issues).
While commentators have taken different positions on the advisability of screen-
ing programs, virtually all commentators have discussed the privacy aspects of such
programs. Commentators have also frequently discussed the accuracy of screening
programs. See infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
16. A majority of the bills and proposals that have been considered by state legis-
latures limit the action an employer may take as a result of drug testing. In addition,
employees are granted certain rights through the regulation of the manner and cir-
cumstances of testing and confidentiality requirements. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL, MEMO. No. 87-82 (June 11, 1987) (on file at William Mitchell Law
Review office). The City of San Francisco's ordinance, enacted in 1985, was the first
drug testing law. Drug testing laws have subsequently been enacted in Connecticut,
Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at 2-5.
Over thirty state legislatures are considering or have considered proposed laws
aimed at placing limits on testing employees for substance abuse. Id. at 1. Jurisdic-
tions that have not yet adopted substance screening laws, but are actively considering
them, include California, Colorado, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. Id. at 5-10;
see also McGovern, Employee Drug Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War
on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453 app. B (1987) (comparing 1987 drug testing legisla-
tion); Comment, Behind the Hysteria of Compulsory Drug Screening in Employment. Urinal-
ysis Can Be a Legitimate Tool for Helping Resolve the Nation's Drug Problem if Competing
Interests of Employer and Employee Are Equitably Balanced, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 597, 932-55 nn.
2015-084 (1987) (discussing recently enacted drug testing statutes).
The enacted bills contain a variety of provisions aiming to balance employer,
employee, and societal interests. See Act of July 6, 1987, Pub. Act No. 87-551, 1987
Conn. Legis. Serv. 500 (West); Act ofJune 5, 1987, § 730.5, 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv.
132 (West); MINN. STAT. §§ 181.950-.957 (1987 Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-
304 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-6.5-1, 28-6.5-2 (1987 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 34-38-1 - 34-15 (1987 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (1987).
Statutory drug testing provisions limit testing in three ways: who and when an
employer can test; how the testing may be done and by whom; and employee privacy
protections. With the exception of Utah, all recently enacted statutes prohibit ran-
dom testing or limit it to situations where an employee's job is a safety sensitive
position. 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 7; Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(1)2; MoNr. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-304(l)(b); MINN. STAT. § 181.951 subd. 4; R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1;
VT. STAT. ANN. § 513(b). Most statutes limit drug testing of employees to a "for
cause" situation. See 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 6; 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv.
§ 730.5(1)3(a); MINN. STAT. § 181.951 subd. 5; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(1)(c);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1(A); VT. STAT. ANN. § 513(c)(1). Minnesota also allows
testing during routine physical exams, but not more than once a year. MINN. STAT.
§ 181.951 subd. 3. Most states allow drug testing of prospective employees with suf-
ficient notice. See 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 3; 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § l(7)(a);
MINN. STAT. § 181.953 subd. 6; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(1)(b) (allowing preem-
ployment testing for safety-sensitive positions); VT. STAT. ANN. § 512(b)(2). Utah
permits drug testing of nearly any employee at any time. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-3.
Some statutes provide that testing can be carried out only by an independent
laboratory, see Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(1)3(c); MINN. STAT. § 181.953; VT. STAT.
ANN. § 514(4), while others appear to allow employers to test their own employees,
see Conn. Legis. Serv. § 2; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(2)(e); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-
6.5-1(D); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6(4). All statutes except Montana make at least
some mention of standards to be met by the entity conducting the tests. See 1987
19881
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been prompted by the fact that there are differing legal standards
applicable to different classes of employers.18
Generally, an employer's freedom to institute a screening program
is determined by its status.' 9 The status of an employer can be
broadly defined by the category of the employment: 1) public sector
employment;20 2) private sector unionized employment;21 and,
3) private sector non-unionized (at will) employment.22 At least
Conn. Legis. Serv. § 2; 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(3)(0; MINN. STAT. § 181.953;
UTAH CODE ANN. 34-38-6(5); VT. STAT. ANN. § 514(4), (6)(a). All statutes require
confirmation tests. See 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 2; 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv.
§ 730.5(1)3(d); MINN. STAT. §§ 181.950 subd. 9, 181.953 subd. 3; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-304(3); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.5-1(E); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6, subd. 5;
VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 514(6)(A), (B), 515. Most employ chain of custody requirements
for body tissue or fluid handling. See MINN. STAT. § 181.953 subd. 5; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-304(2)(d); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6(4); VT. STAT. ANN. § 514(5).
Some of the statutes require that employers make available to employees a writ-
ten drug testing policy. See MINN. STAT. §§ 181.951(b), 181.952; UTAH STAT. ANN.
§ 34-38-7; VT. STAT. ANN. § 514(2). All statutes except Rhode Island's provide for
confidentiality of test results. See 1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. §§ 3, 5; 1987 Iowa Legis.
Serv. § 730.5(8); MINN. STAT. § 181.954; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(2)(f); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-38-11; VT. STAT. ANN. § 516. Most statutes grant or limit the actions
that employers may take as the result of drug tests. See 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv.
§ 730.5(3)(f); MINN. STAT. § 181.953 subd. 10; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(4);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-8; VT. CODE ANN. § 513(c)(3). Finally, most statutes limit
what body component samples may be tested. See 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv.
§ 730.5(1)1; MINN. STAT. § 181.950 subd. 5; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-2(6); VT. CODE
ANN. § 514(3).
17. See cases cited infra note 107.
18. See A. KNAPP & B. ERVIN, DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE, Minnesota Sen-
ate Research Report, 6-8 Uan., 1987). See also infra notes 19-22, 106-30 and accom-
panying text.
19. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 736-37.
20. The term "public sector employer" is used broadly in this Note. For the
purposes of this Note, a public sector employer is one whose actions are held to
constitutional standards. Constitutional protections will not usually arise unless
there is state action. There will always be state action when the government is the
employer. A private employer may be held to constitutional standards if there is a
sufficient connection to the government. Note, supra note 8, at 554-55. See also Com-
ment, supra note 16, at 651-89 (discussing state action in drug screening situations).
See generally Ayers, Constitutional Issues Implicated By Public Employee Drug Testing, 14 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 337 (1988). For the purposes of this Note, a private sector em-
ployer is any employer who is not a public sector employer.
21. For the purposes of this Note, a unionized employer is any private sector
employer who has signed a collective bargaining agreement. See generally
Schmedemann, Unions and Urinalysis, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 277 (1988). Many
public sector employers have signed collective bargaining agreements. In fact, public
sector unions have led the court battles against urinalysis screening. See infra notes
111-17 and accompanying text. The distinction is important. Public sector employ-
ers are bound by constitutional standards, while private sector employers generally
are not. See id.
22. The term "at will employer" will refer to the non-public sector employer
whose employees have signed neither a collective bargaining agreement nor a per-
[Vol. 14
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sixty-seven percent, and probably nearer to eighty percent, of Ameri-
can workers are at will employees.23 In spite of that fact, much of the
scholarly analysis and virtually all of the case law concerns urinalysis
substance screening of public sector employees. There is a dearth of
literature and case law concerning urinalysis screening of at will em-
ployees. This Note will attempt to fill that information gap by focus-
ing on urinalysis substance screening of the at will employee.
Part I of the Note examines the reasons given by employers for
instituting screening programs. Part II analyzes the goals employers
attempt to reach by instituting screening in light of screen accuracy
and the inherent limitations of screening programs. Part III briefly
explores the standards for the implementation of screening pro-
grams developed by the judiciary for the public and private sectors.
Part IV examines the potential liabilities of at will employers who
institute screening programs. Part V analyzes the Minnesota legisla-
tion regulating screening programs. Part VI suggests guidelines for
instituting screening programs in the at will sector. The Note con-
cludes with recommendations for refinement of the Minnesota legis-
lation regulating screening programs.
I. EMPLOYER'S REASONS FOR SCREENING
Employers generally point to four factors as justification for sub-
stance screening. First, employers contend that substance use has a
direct economic impact on business, largely attributable to lost pro-
ductivity. Second, employers fear liability may attach because of
traditional employer responsibility for the acts of employees. Third,
employers fear losses attributable to employee theft and disclosure
of business secrets. Finally, employers assert that conduct by em-
sonal service contract. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that "[t]he usual em-
ployer-employee relationship is terminable at the will of either; the employer can
summarily dismiss the employee, the employee is under no obligation to remain at
thejob." Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221
(1962) (quoting Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 295 (1960)). "A hiring
for an indefinite term is terminable at will." Id. (quoting Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper
Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936)).
23. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Ex-
ercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1410 n.32, 33 (1967). Professor
Blades' figures were based on evidence gathered during the early 1960's. The de-
cline in union membership indicates that the actual percentage of the American
workforce who are at will employees is closer to 80%. See also Kovach, Organized La-
bor's Deteriorating Condition, 36 LAB. L.J. 850, 850 (1985) (1985 union membership was
18.8% of the workforce); Tomlinson, Future Labor Law Trends: A Look at the Second Half
of the 1980's, 36 LAB. L.J. 300, 300 (1985) (union membership was 18.8% of the
workforce in 1984). The figures only disclose the union/non-union member status of
the workforce and do not take into account the number of employees who have
signed employment contracts. See supra note 21.
1988]
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ployees during off-work hours impacts their on-the-job fitness.24
The theme underlying these factors is an employer's desire to run a
business more profitably by eliminating, or reducing, costs associ-
ated with labor.
A. Direct Economic Impact of Substance Use
There is no question that substance use has some economic impact
on employers.25 The debate about the extent of that impact calls
into question the reasonableness of screening to enhance profits.26
The "economic impact" rationale is most frequently used to encom-
pass four specific employer concerns about on-the-job substance
24. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Poli-
cies, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 407, 407-08 (1985). The heart of these rationales is their
relationship to business' profitability. The incongruity of implementing screening
for illicit substances distresses some critics, in view of the historic tolerance of alco-
hol in the workplace. Compare RORABAUGH, supra note 5, at 19 (describing the
"elevens," a liquor break equivalent to a coffee break) with Alcohol & Drugs, supra note
8, at 8 (citing research setting the cost of alcohol abuse to business at twice the level
of the cost of illegal drugs). One of the complaints of screening opponents is that
screening seems to be aimed only at those who use illegal drugs. They ask why an
employee impaired by illegal substances should be penalized more harshly than an
employee impaired by legal substances. The point is that they are both impaired.
25. Geidt, supra note 14, at 181-82 (referring to studies that show that alcohol
and drug abuse cost businesses tens of billions of dollars each year). See Alcohol &
Drugs, supra note 8, at 8-9 (citing Research Triangle Institute figures that estimated
the cost of alcohol and drug abuse at $99 billion in productivity losses, $8.1 billion in
health service charges and another $81 billion in alcohol and drug related accidents
in 1983-84).
26. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 9. One of the difficulties in deciding what the
costs attributable to substance abuse to business is determining what exactly is meant
by "lost productivity." At least one industry specialist is skeptical: "Most of the
figures that I see.., are often produced by... people whose jobs depend on [treat-
ing substance abuse].... I'm not saying there isn't a problem, I'm just saying the
statistics sometimes make you wonder how they gather the information, and what
their real purpose is in doing so." Id. Most of the figures used to demonstrate the
economic impact of substance abuse are extrapolations made by companies and indi-
viduals who have a financial stake in the employee assistance or drug consulting busi-
ness. See, e.g., Bensinger, Drugs in the Workplace. Employers' Rights and Responsibilities,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Apr. 1984). Peter Bensinger is a former head of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and currently a partner in Bensinger, DuPont and As-
soc., one of the leading consulting firms for private industry in the area of substance
abuse in the workplace. Id. at iii-iv.
Kevin Zeese is another frequent contributor on the topic. See, e.g., Zeese, Drug
Hysteria Causing Use of Useless Urine Tests, 11 NOVA L. REV. 815 (1987). Zeese is also
legal advisor to the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML). Id. at 815. T. Denenberg and R.V. Denenberg are a veritable cottage
industry on the topic of alcohol and drugs in the workplace. See DENENBERG &
DENENBERG, ALCOHOL & DRUGS: ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE (1983); Alcohol & Drugs,
supra note 8, at 2; T. Denenberg and R.V. Denenberg, Drug Testing from the Arbitrators's
Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REV. 371 (1987).
[Vol. 14
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use. 2 7 First, employers contend that an employee whose substance
screen is positive is per se unproductive. 2 8 Critics contend that em-
ployees should be judged on actual job performance, not on the
presence or absence of certain metabolites in their urine.29 These
critics particularly point to the inability of screens to detect current
impairment.3
0
The second concern is embodied in employer dissatisfaction with
employee absenteeism attributable to substance abuse. Studies show
that substance abusing employees have a significantly higher absen-
tee rate than non-abusers.31 Employers also contend that employees
who fail to show up for work due to substance abuse affect productiv-
ity as much as, if not more than, employees who arrive at work in an
impaired condition or employees who become impaired after
arrival.32
Third, employers contend that by eliminating the substance abus-
ing employee, they will realize significant savings in the form of re-
27. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 407-08.
28. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 766. See also Donnelly, Privacy in the Workplace, EDI-
TORIAL RES. RPTs. 207, 212 (1985).
29. See Donnelly, supra note 28, at 213. The two dominant workplace screening
procedures are both immunoassay techniques. Weisner, Urinalysis: Defense Approaches,
15 ADVOCATE 114, 115 (Mar.-Apr. 1983). The Radio Immunoassay (R.I.A.) involves
low level radiation. The Enzyme Immunoassay (E.I.A.) does not. Because it uses
radiation, the R.I.A. must be performed in a laboratory. Using E.I.A. techniques, the
Syva Company has developed a desktop drug detection device. See DOGOLOFF & AN-
GAROLA, URINE TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 20-21 (1985). Neither of the tests meas-
ures the amount of a drug in the urine. The body breaks chemicals down into
compounds called metabolites. The immunoassay tests detect the metabolites of
specific drugs. Each drug has its own metabolite. The similarity of these metabolites
to natural metabolites, or metabolites from non-intoxicating substances is a cause of
"false positive" screens. Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results
for the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 397-98 (1984).
See also infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text. The Emit test is essentially an "off-
on" test. Emit tests can be set to read positive at various nanograms of a substance
per milliliter of urine. The test then registers a positive reaction for concentrations
of the substance at or above the setting. The military sets tests to register positive at
100 ng/ml. Some employers set positive readings as low as 50 ng/ml. The setting of
a test can determine, in part, the number of "false positive" results. See DOGOLOFF &
ANGAROLA, supra at 21-24.
30. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 274-75; Weisner, supra note 29, at 118. While
the effect of most drugs lasts for minutes or a few hours, they are detectable long
after use. For example, marijuana metabolites are detectable in urine up to eighteen
days after light use. McBay, supra note 14, at 649.
31. See Ver Ploeg, Drug Testing in the Workplace, 43 BENCH & BAR 14, 14 (Nov.
1986). Substance users have an absenteeism rate sixteen times higher than non-us-
ing employees, use sick leave more often and are late to work more often. Note, supra
note 8, at 534.
32. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 7-9. Alcoholics use up to ten times the nor-
mal amount of sick leave. Up to 40% of industrial fatalities and 47% of industrial
injuries can be linked to alcohol. Id. See also supra note 31.
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duced health care costs. Studies have shown that employees
involved in substance abuse have greater health care needs and costs
than non-abusing employees.33
Finally, employers are concerned about their duty to provide a safe
working environment. Workers' compensation costs are a significant
part of an employer's cost of doing business. 34 Moreover, when an
accident is precipitated by an employee impaired because of sub-
stance use, an employer may be subjected to liability in addition to
worker's compensation.35
B. Employer Responsibility for Acts of Employees
The concept that employers are liable for the acts of employees
acting within the scope of their employment is well established law.36
Employers have a duty to investigate the backgrounds of employees
whose actions impact on the safety of others.37 Employer liability
may arise in situations where an employee's actions immediately
cause injury to a third party, or when the injury is realized at a later
time.38
Immediate liability arises when an employee, under the influence
of an intoxicant, causes a physical injury.39 A typical example of im-
mediate liability is the intoxicated employee who causes a traffic acci-
dent. Of particular concern are individuals engaged in employment
where a minor mistake in judgment could cause major injuries.40
33. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 407.
34. Morris, Those Burgeoning Worker Benefits, NAT. Bus. 53, 53-54 (Feb. 1987).
35. Bensinger, supra note 26, at 2, 7-8.
36. See, e.g., Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1979) (em-
ployer held liable for fire caused by an inebriated employee's negligent smoking).
Gatzke was discussed in Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306,
310 (Minn. 1982). Marston refined the concept that an employee need only be par-
tially furthering an employer's interests for the employer to be liable for the em-
ployee's actions. Id. at 311.
37. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983). The
scope of the investigation required is proportional to the risk of injury to third parties
and the severity of risk encountered. Id. at 913. In enacting the drug testing statute,
the Minnesota Legislature has removed the legal duty to screen employees for sub-
stance use. Drug & Alcohol Testing in the Workplace, 1987 Minn. Laws Ch. 388,
§ 2, subd. 7 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 181.951 subd. 7 (1987)). In many situations
the law prohibits testing. See infra notes 240-311 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements for screening that employers must comply with). Obviously, if an em-
ployer is prohibited by law from making a particular type of investigation, it is rea-
sonable not to do so.
38. See Bensinger, supra note 26, at 2.
39. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983) (employer
liable for accident caused by intoxicated employee sent home from work).
40. The concern is that employees who are intoxicated when making crucial deci-
sions will be unable to make them, will make them too slowly or will make the wrong
decision. See Bensinger, supra note 26, at 2-3.
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Employment categories frequently mentioned are surgeons, airline
pilots, and nuclear power plant workers.41
Attenuated liability arises when an intoxicated employee's actions
create a situation that will cause injury at a later time. 4 2 An intoxi-
cated employee might be responsible for a product defect that causes
an injury to the consumer. 43 More typically, an intoxicated em-
ployee will cause injury of an economic nature, such as a mathemati-
cal error, causing a company to lose money.4 4
C. Disclosure of Business Secrets and Employee Theft
Employers believe screening will reduce losses attributable to em-
ployee theft and the disclosure of business secrets. Costs to busi-
nesses from employee thefts are significant.45 Employers have a
legitimate interest in curtailing costs attributable to employee
theft.46 There is, however, no evidence that substance abusing em-
ployees are responsible for a disproportionate share of employee
theft. 4 7 Furthermore, it is doubtful that screening for substance use
is anything more than a "quick fix" that fails to address the real
41. Bornstein, Drug and Alcohol Issues in the Workplace: An Arbitrator's Perspective,
ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 19, 22.
42. See Bensinger, supra note 26, at 1 (substance abuse can affect the public
through the product produced or service provided). See also Englade, Who's Hired And
Who's Fired, STUDENT LAw., Apr. 1986, at 20, 22 (discussing bookkeeping errors
bringing company to edge of bankruptcy).
43. See Bensinger, supra note 26, at 1.
44. Englade, supra note 42, at 22 (the list of service providers who have no impact
on safety but can impact on a business' financial health is lengthy). See D'Aquila, The
Legal Perils of Alcohol and Drugs in the Workplace, HENNEPIN LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 6,
20-21 (discussing initiation of drug testing due to fears of financial losses).
45. Some businesses thrive on advising companies of ways to cut down on em-
ployee theft. Hoffer, A New Focus on Drugs, NAT. Bus., Dec. 1986, at 57, 59.
46. Menaker, Drug Screening. Protecting the Workplace and the Employee, INDUS. LABOR
REL. Rvr., Spr. 1986, at 18, 18. The management theory is that substance-using em-
ployees steal from the company to pay for drugs. Id. See Susser, Legal Issues Raised by
Drugs in the Workplace, LABOR L.J., Jan. 1985, at 42, 42.
47. Studies have shown that substance-abusing employees are more likely to
steal. See Ver Ploeg, supra note 31, at 14. This author has located no studies, how-
ever, comparing the dollar amounts of thefts by abusing and non-abusing employees.
Interview with Professor Christine Ver Ploeg, Professor of Law at William Mitchell
College of Law, Labor Arbitrator (Sept. 18, 1987) (Professor Ver Ploeg knows of no
such study). Other causes of employee theft, such as gambling losses, account for
large business losses. Id. See also POLYGRAPHS & EMPLOYMENT, SPECIAL REPORT
(BNA) at 10 (1985) (citing a study by Clark and Associates in 1979 of 1,400 Minneap-
olis-St. Paul department store employees) [hereinafter POLYGRAPHS & EMPLOYMENT].
The forms of employee theft are:
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causes of employee theft.48
Disclosure of business secrets may arise for the same reasons as
employee theft. In such a situation, an employee sells a business'
secrets, either to a competitor or to an intermediary.49 Employers
further theorize that the substance abusing employee may, while in-
toxicated, inadvertently reveal confidential information.50
D. Impact of Off- Work Behavior on Job Fitness
One of the most controversial employer rationales for urinalysis
substance screening is the notion that employees are twenty-four
hour-a-day representatives of the employer.51 Employers assert that
acts of employees reflect on the employer.52 Inherent in this theory
is the idea that an employee can never engage in acts disapproved of
by the employer.53
In the union workplace, discharge for on-the-job misconduct is a
well settled management right, while discharge for off-the-job behav-
57% - abuse of employee discounts
12% - taking mechandise
9% - claiming more hours than worked
5% - undercharging at the register
4% - claiming excess expenses
2% - damaging merchandise
2% - taking money
Id.
48. See POLYGRAPHS & EmPLOYMENT, supra note 47, at 14 (discussing polygraphs).
Better ways to protect company assets are: "good recordkeeping; attractive dis-
counts for company products; a healthy organizational climate; loss prevention sys-
tems that protect assets without abusing employees; good management; and senior
management that is honest in its dealings with both employees and customers." Id.
49. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 408.
50. See id.
51. See Dawson & Hill, Discharge for Off-Duty Misconduct in the Private and Public Sec-
tors, ARB.J.,June 1985, at 25. "A common argument presented by management Uus-
tifying discharge for employee off-duty behavior] is that the employee's off-duty
conduct causes injury or harm to the company." Id. Many commentators believe
employees have a right to expect employers to respect employee privacy. See, e.g.,
Barnes & White, Employee Privacy Rights "Everything You Always Wanted to Know - But
Shouldn't", 64 MicH. B.J. 1104, 1110-11 (1985) (the authors argue that employees
have a right to privacy in personal information that employers cannot permissibly
invade). See also Englade, supra note 42, at 24 (discussing case involving employee
fired for off-duty drug use); Gambel & Zeese, supra note 12, at 38 (most employment
contracts forbid only on-the-job intoxication); Stille, supra note 15, at 23-24 (detailing
ways urinalysis intrudes on privacy); Susser, supra note 46, at 49 (arbitrator ruling
that off-duty employee not required to submit to testing); VerPloeg, supra note 31, at
20 (arbitrators increasingly distinguishing between on-job and off-job substance use);
Note, supra note 13, at 276-80 (arguing that employees have a legitimate privacy in-
terest in information discoverable through urinalysis).
52. Dawson & Hill, supra note 51, at 24-25.
53. See generally Dawson & Hill, supra note 51, at 24-25; Marmo, Public Employees:
On-the-Job Distipline for Off-the-Job Behavior, ARB. J., June, 1985, at 3.
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ior is an unresolved issue.54 Generally, to justify a discharge for off-
the-job conduct, the employer must show a nexus between the be-
havior and the workplace.55 The behavior must: 1) impact on the
employee's ability or suitability for an assigned task; 2) impact on the
employer's business; 3) result in the refusal of other employees to
work with that employee; or, 4) adversely impact on the employer-
employee relationship.56
Unless at least one of these factors is present, an employer gener-
ally cannot dismiss a union employee with impunity.57 Even when
one of these factors does exist, the employer must show a concrete
relationship between the factor and an inability to continue the em-
ployment relationship.58
An at will employer is currently not constrained in discharging an
employee for off-duty conduct.59 The very nature of at will employ-
ment is that neither party needs any reason for terminating the em-
ployment relationship.60 Guidelines developed in other sectors of
employment may find their way into the at will sector. Finally, even
though the at will employer may avoid liability under a wrongful dis-
charge theory, the employer may still bear some financial responsi-
bility through unemployment compensation.
6 '
54. Dawson & Hill, supra note 51, at 24.
55. Bensinger, supra note 26, at 3.
56. Dawson & Hill, supra note 51, at 24-25.
57. Id. See also Comment, supra note 16, at 621-23, 845-89 (discussing dismissals
for off-work behavior and case studies of disputes between unions and employers
involving the "just cause" standard for dismissal).
58. Dawson & Hill, supra note 51 at 35 (determination of discharge is dependent
upon the extent to which the misconduct affects the employment relationship -miti-
gating factors such as good work record may offset potential discharge). But see
Geidt, supra note 14, at 195-96 (usually an off-duty conviction will not result in a
discharge, although some arbitrators do recognize the conduct as adversely affecting
the business).
59. See supra note 22.
60. Id.
61. The employer may be liable for unemployment compensation taxes attributa-
ble to benefits paid to a discharged employee. See infra notes 254-83 and accompany-
ing text. See also Glide Lumber Prods. Co. v. Smith, 86 Or. App. 669, 741 P.2d 907,
910-11 (1987) (testing positive for marijuana on a urinalysis test not grounds for
denial of unemployment compensation benefits), rev'd on other grounds, Glide Lumber
Prods. Co. v. Employment Div., 87 Or. App. 152, 741 P.2d 904, 906-07 (reversed and
remanded to determine if employee's voluntary departure was for good cause and
therefore compensable); Philomath Forest Prods. Co. v. Employment Div., 86 Or.
App. 678, 741 P.2d 912, 914 (1987) (testing positive for amphetamine and cocaine
use not grounds for denial of unemployment compensation benefits); MINN. STAT.
§ 268.06 subd. 6 (1986) (computation of assessments on an employer for unemploy-
ment compensation taxes based on "experience ratio," which is calculated by the
benefits paid to former employees of that employer); Note, Other Considerations: Work-
ers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, and Chain of Custody, 23 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 585, 590-97 (1987) (discussing requirement of willful misconduct prior to dis-
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II. SCREEN ACCURACY & SCREEN RESULT UTILIZATION
Underlying the employer rationales for urinalysis substance
screening just enumerated is the assumption that the means (urinal-
ysis) will achieve the end (a drug free work force). 62 A similar as-
sumption underlies employers' arguments in favor of polygraph
testing.63 These assumptions have been rejected by legislatures as
well as the judiciary.64 As in polygraph examinations, urinalysis
screening is suspect in two critical areas: accuracy and utilization of
results.65
A. Screen Accuracy
Part of the measure of the success of any screening program will
be its cost effectiveness. 66 The 1980 development of the EMIT test
by Syva Company made urinalysis screening affordable to busi-
nesses. 6 7 The key to an effective screening program is to accurately
qualification of employees from unemployment compensation benefits). Compare
MINN. STAT. § 268.09 subd. 1(b) (Supp. 1987) (misconduct is conduct "not amount-
ing to gross misconduct connected with work or... misconduct which interferes with
and adversely affects employment") with MINN. STAT. § 268.09 subd. 1(2)(b) (1986)
(employee discharged for chemical dependency who has not made efforts to obtain
and maintain treatment is disqualified from receiving benefits).
62. Gampel & Zeese, supra note 12, at 37. The authors point out that urine test-
ing does not measure impairment or intoxication, so that a positive result is unre-
lated to employment.
63. Note, supra note 13, at 277-79. See also POLYGRAPHS & EMPLOYMENT, supra
note 47, at 10. " '[T]he most critical untested assumption, . . . is that the information
collected through screening can accurately predict future theft behavior beyond what
would be expected by chance.'" (quoting BAUMER & ROSENBAUM, COMBATING RETAIL
THEFT: PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES (1984), speaking about polygraph testing). The
assumption is that in identifying employees likely to steal, employers can effectively
limit employee thefts. Analogously, employers utilizing urinalysis substance screen-
ing assume that urinalysis screening will identify employees likely to abuse sub-
stances; and identifying those employees will limit employee substance use in the
workplace and thereby increase employer profit by minimizing costs. Experts in the
area of employee theft, however, emphasize the importance of established manage-
ment policies and procedures in theft prevention, rather than screening. Id. (citing
BAUMER & ROSENBAUM, COMBATING RETAIL THEFT: PROGRAMS & STRATEGIES (1984)).
64. See supra note 16. See also infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
65. Note, supra note 13, at 277-79. Result utilization encompasses not only the
question of what information the employer may legitimately attempt to learn by
screening an employee, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, but also how
the employer may use information revealed in screens.
66. See Spitzer, Drug Screening: Usually Unnecessary, Frequently Unreliable and Perhaps
Unlawful, INDUS. LABOR REL. REPT., 21, 22-23 (Spr. 1986) (estimates of costs to indus-
try for drug abuse, which in turn affect estimates of cost savings through testing, are
derived from assumptions and statistics based upon drug treatment programs).
67. Imwinkelried, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Visdom of Govermental Prohibition
or Regulation of Employee Urinalysis Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 563, 566-68 (1987). The
Emit costs about $5 per sample. Gas chromatography/mass spectometry (GC/MS),
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identify all employees who are abusing substances. Similarly, an ef-
fective program should not mistakenly identify employees who are
not using substances. Anything less than perfection affects thecost
effectiveness of a program. 68 Critics of screening programs have fo-
cused on two weaknesses of the EMIT test: inaccurate results and the
inability of the test to detect present impairment.69
generally used as a confirmatory test because of its accuracy, may cost as much as
$200 per sample. Many employers do not choose confirmatory testing due to its high
cost. Id. at 568.
68. Spitzer, supra note 66, at 22-23. A basic assumption is that screening pro-
grams are focused on identifying substance users so employers will not have to bear
the costs associated with drug use in the workplace. See supra note 66 and accompa-
nying text. See also Note, supra note 13, at 272. Employers fear that an employee who
uses ilicit substances might use them in the workplace. If not identified through
screening, the employer will have to bear the costs associated with that employee's
substance use. So long as screening costs an employer less than it saves, a screening
program is cost effective. See POLYGRAPHS & EMPLOYMENT, supra note 47, at 11-12
(discussing the cost effectiveness of polygraphs).
A hidden cost of screening, sometimes not considered in an employer's eco-
nomic evaluation of the issue, is the damage inflicted on employee relations by the
implementation of a screening program. The mere request that an employee submit
to a screen casts a cloud over that employee. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 33.
This can lead to increased suspicion between employers and employees, and among
employees. See Zeese, supra note 26, at 820. This situation can become worse when a
supervisor dislikes an individual employee and requires that employee to take one or
more screens. See id. Even when the employee's test results are negative, other em-
ployees may believe that the employee would not have been selected without good
cause. Particularly galling to many employees is that urinalysis screening reverses
the usual presumptions regarding innocence: the employee is presumed guilty until
proven innocent. Stone, Mass Round-Up Urinalysis and Original Intent, 11 NOVA L. REV.
733, 743 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 205-06 (EMIT tests are inaccurate and im-
precise); Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 29 (urine tests cannot show impairment);
Stone, supra note 68, at 740-41 (EMIT tests are unreliable and frequently result in
false positive results which are damaging to the employee). Despite all of the discus-
sion in various articles about the ramifications of false positive screen results, see, e.g.,
Miller, supra note 15, at 205-07; Waple, Drug Tests: Issues Raised in the Defense of a
"Positive" Result, 11 NOVA L. REV. 751, 759 (1987), little concern is shown about false
negatives. See Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV. 415,
445 (1987). "The frequency of occurrence of false negative test results is unknown,
for all practical purposes, because negative test results are rarely repeated or con-
firmed by further analysis." Id. This can probably be explained by noting that false
positives will result in action against an individual, while a false negative does not.
See DOGOLOFF & ANGAROLA, supra note 29, at 23. The only mention of false negative
results and their prevention arises within the context of discussions centering on the
need for observation of employees while collecting the specimen in order to prevent
sample adulterations. See, e.g., Note, Employee Drug Testing - Issues Facing Private Sector
Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832, 839 (1987) (the only sure way to guarantee the integ-
rity of the urine sample is to have a witness observe the subject during testing). For a




Smith: To Test or Not To Test: Is That the Question? Urinalysis Substanc
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Inaccurate results can be false positive or false negative. 70 False
positive results identify employees not using substances as users.
False negative results identify employees using substances as nonus-
ers. Either result may arise from sample handling errors. 71 False
positives also arise because a formidable number of chemicals have
similarities to the substances that testing is designed to detect.72
False negatives also appear because of sample tampering or the in-
herent imprecision of the screen.73 They may also appear because
different individuals metabolize substances at different rates and in-
dividual substances metabolize at different rates. 74 Although Syva
claims EMIT tests are 95% accurate under laboratory conditions, 75
they have been found to be up to 100% inaccurate.76
The inability of screens to detect present impairment is nearly as
controversial as their inaccuracy.77 Urinalysis screens do not mea-
70. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 30. A 1981 study by the Center for Disease
Control found false-negative results as high as 100% in testing for the presence of
cocaine and amphetimines. False-positives ran as high as 37% on amphetimines. See
id.
71. Id. Accord Note, supra note 14, at 1459-60 (improper handling and diagnostic
error encouraged by nontechnical personnel administering the tests). See National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 389 (E.D. La. 1986) (dis-
cussing sampling error problems) aff'd as modified, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
72. See Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 389. Quoting testimony of Dr. Arthur McBay,
the court listed over-the-counter cold and pain medicines that will trigger false posi-
tives. Included in the list are: Advil, Motrin, Nuprin, Nyquil and Contac. Dr. McBay,
a toxicologist who holds a Ph.D. in pharmaceutical chemistry, pointed out that the
tests cannot distinquish between the legal drug codeine and the illegal drug heroin.
Id. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1459 n.52 (aspirin can also cause false-positives).
73. See Zeese, supra note 26, at 819. For example, urine samples may be tam-
pered with by adding salt or other substances to change the pH of the urine. Id.
Other methods include: refusing to give the first urine of the day or drinking large
quantities of liquids to dilute the sample. See id. Finally, positive test results may be
avoided by substituting another's substance-free urine for one's own. Id. See also
supra note 12.
74. See Note, supra note 14, at 1459 (substance use habits, stress, weight, diet,
menstrual cycle and other factors make results vary).
75. Id. at 1460 n.56 (95% is the figure given by the test's manufacturer).
76. Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 422, 426-27 (1985). False positive results for Methadone ranged as
high as 66% while false negatives for amphetamines, cocaine, codeine and morphine
ranged as high as 100%. Id. A troubling aspect of testing is that substance screens
are now being marketed for use in the workplace, instead of in the laboratory. Id. at
427. This allows personnel, relatively untrained in drug testing, to hold the power of
job termination in their hands. Id.
77. See Note, supra note 13, at 274. See also McBay, Efficient Drug Testing: Addressing
the Basic Issues, 11 NOVA L. REV. 647, 649 (1987). A person is usually considered
impaired by a substance when under the influence of the substance. See id. Even that
broad definition can be inaccurate because there are some substances that improve
performance. Id. Cocaine, an illegal substance, and caffeine, a legal substance, in
small doses do not impair and can enhance performance. Id. at 652. In one test
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sure the amount of a substance in a person's blood.78 The screens
do not indicate a certain level of impairment at the time of testing.79
Urine contains only chemicals being discharged from the body.80
Positive urine screens indicate only that at some time prior to the
screen administration, the individual was exposed to the substance
whose metabolite has been targeted.8 1 Screens do not necessarily
indicate that an individual is a substance user, or that an individual
is, was, or will be impaired by substance use while working.82
Similarly, a negative screen indicates only that an individual has no
metabolites in the urine at the moment of the screen, not that the
individual will not use intoxicants in the future.83 An employer
utilizing screening is doing so to identify employees who might use
drivers drove a course before and after smoking marijuana. Most of the drivers re-
mained close to their initial scores and two drivers improved their scores after smok-
ing marijuana. Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 775 (citing Knepper, Puff, the Dangerous
Drug, CAR & DRIVER, June 1980, at 43; Thompson, High Driving, CAR & DRIVER, Mar.
1980, at 30).
The employer rationale that screening is justified to reduce the number of em-
ployees working while impaired is subject to attack when the employer tests only for
illegal drugs and not for alcohol. See McBay, supra at 650-51 (most urine tests have
been for the purpose of detecting marijuana metabolites); Wisotsky, supra note 1, at
768-70 (many private testing programs apply only to illegal drugs and disregard alco-
hol, the major source of employee impairment). If the only reason for testing for
substances is to find illegal drug use, employers begin acting for the government. Id.
at 777.
78. See Note, supra note 13, at 274 (a positive urine test is only evidence that the
person being tested at some time prior to the test ingested the drug).
79. See id. See also Englade, supra note 42, at 23-24. Accord Note, supra note 14, at
1457 nn.39-40 (metabolites do not indicate that a person was "high" at time of test-
ing -only that substance was used recently).
80. See Note, supra note 14, at 1458 n.44 (the kidney removes waste from body
fluids and deposits it into the urine to be excreted). See also Dubowski, supra note 69,
at 432-35, 523-25 (describing the process by which drugs are absorbed into the body,
distributed through the blood system, take effect on the body and are then excreted
from the body). The very fact that a chemical (or its metabolite) is being discarded
from the body is indicative of the fact that the body is not, at that moment, under the
influence of that particular chemical. Id.
81. Note, supra note 14, at 1457 n.40. With the exception of alcohol, there is no
data correlating the urine concentration of particular substances with intoxication.
Dubowski, supra note 69, at 519-20. Another concern is that screens do not distin-
guish between active and passive exposure. Id. at 527. Passive exposure can result in
a positive urinalysis screen. Id. An example of passive exposure is "inhalation of
ambient air by a nonsmoking person in the vicinity of heavy marijuana smokers ... "
Id. See Sonnenstuhl, Tice, Staudenmeir & Steele, Employee Assistance and Drug Testing:
Fairness &Injustice in the Workplace, 11 NoVA L. REV. 709, 721 (1987) [hereinafter Son-
nenstuhl] (train conductors often fear walking through marijuana-smoke filled cars
because, by inhaling the fumes, they could test positive during urinalysis screening).
82. See Spitzer, supra note 66, at 23-24.
83. See Donnelly, supra note 28, at 213 (a urine test may not show a positive result
when a person is intoxicated, but may produce positive results weeks later as the
body discharges metabolites). The very nature of a urine screen is to delve into an
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intoxicants on the job.84 The failure to identify users damages the
effectiveness of the entire screening program.8 5
B. Utilization of Screen Results
Urinalysis can convey a significant amount of information about an
individual.86 The ability of screens to reveal non-work related infor-
mation concerns many critics of screening programs.8 7 As well as
detecting intoxicants, urinalysis can reveal the individual's medical
history for a wide array of ailments.88 Employees, after giving the
sample, have no control over which tests are performed on it. Thus,
employees cannot limit speciman usage simply to the detection of
substance use.8 9
While the immediate goal of any screening program is to reduce
substance use in the workplace,90 it is assumed that this reduction
will accomplish the goals embodied in the employer rationale.91 In
utilizing screen results to achieve those goals, there are several op-
tions available to the employer: 1) referral to authorities for prosecu-
tion; 2) discipline; and 3) rehabilitation.92
Few, if any, employers will give information gleaned in substance
screening to authorities for use in prosecution.03 It is questionable,
individual's past. The screen says nothing about an individual's present or future
behavior. Sonnenstuhl, supra note 81, at 718-19.
84. See Note, Workers, Drinks and Drugs: Can Employers Test?, 55 U. CIN. L. REV.
127, 145 (1986) (employers fear they must screen out drug users or be forced out of
business because companies that do screen will have lower accident rates and higher
productivity).
85. When the employer's goal is to eliminate the employee who uses substances,
that goal is defeated when even one employee who uses substances tests negative.
See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
86. See Note, supra note 13, at 279 (a urine sample contains information about a
person's medical history of illness).
87. See Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 387 (quoting McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985)) (reasonable expectation of privacy in personal informa-
tion contained in body fluids). See also Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 29.
88. A urinalysis test can reveal venereal disease, epilepsy, schizophrenia, suscep-
tibility to heart attacks and sickle cell anemia. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 29.
89. Id. (employees have no control over what tests are performed on a urine
specimen and thus cannot limit specimen testing simply to the detection of substance
use).
90. Id. at 28 (screening advocates believe that the threat of drug testing will limit
future drug use by 85-90% of employees).
91. Id. See supra notes 24-56 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Geidt, supra note 14, at 197-203 (describing the differences between
the theories and providing practical suggestions for the employer).
93. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 408 (most employers do not seek
convictions of their employees). See also Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1520 (employers may
not have authority to withhold screen information from government agencies, partic-
ularly when the employer is the government).
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in view of screen accuracy problems, whether such information
would be admissable in a prosecution.94 Additionally, an employer
might be subjected to tort liability if a screen result was inaccurate.95
Most frequently, information in employer hands about substance use
will only be passed on to law enforcement if it indicates sales of ille-
gal drugs.
96
Currently, many employers resort to discipline alone in using
screen results. 9 7 Some employers simply discharge an employee
who tests positive for substance use.9 8 These employers reason that
doing so will assure them of a drug free workforce.99 Other employ-
ers apply progressive discipline, that can culminate in termina-
tion.iOO Employers use discipline alone either because they look
upon the substance abuser as having a moral deficiency, or because
they do not provide an employee assistance program.01
Some employers utilize substance screening programs to direct
employees into employee assistance programs.' 0 2 Employers do so
believing that in the long run employee assistance programs are
more cost effective than either discharge or progressive discipline.lOS
Experts urge a combination of progressive discipline, employee
assistance programs, and abuse awareness programs. 104 While com-
mentators do not believe these programs are a panacea, they do be-
lieve that employers must take a more sympathetic view of employee
substance use. These commentators maintain that the problem of
substance use in the workplace has a more complex origin than sim-
94. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2248 (1986) (polygraphs not proven reliable enough for submission as evi-
dence); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521 (discussing unreliability of urinalysis screens and
their likely inadmissability).
95. See Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 65-66 (discussing Houston Belt & Termi-
nal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977), where employer
was liable for defamation). See also supra notes 162-215.
96. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 408-09. See Bensinger, supra note 26,
at 7-8.
97. Rothstein, supra note 76, at 434 (providing a list of the essential components
of a comprehensive drug abuse program).
98. See Note, supra note 13, at 275-76; Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 22.
99. See Geidt, supra note 14, at 197 (some arbitrators are more willing to order
rehabilitation for alcohol abusers than abusers of other substances).
100. Rothstein, supra note 76, at 434 (experts believe that a drug abusing em-
ployee should be given rehabilitation rather than punishment).
101. See Sonnenstuhl &Tice, Lessons From EAP's for Drug Screening, INDUS. LAB. REL.
Ri-r. 25, 27-29 (Spr. 1986).
102. Rothstein, supra note 70, at 434.
103. Id. at 434-35 (in addition to the cost savings, there are human savings such as
the ability to rehabilitate and restore an employee to a healthful and productive
state).
104. Sonnenstuhl & Tice, supra note 101, at 29.
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pie moral deficiency.105
III. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR SCREENING
The ability of employers to take action in relation to their employ-
ees is represented by a continuum. At will employers are least con-
strained. Unionized employers are constrained by the labor
agreements they have signed. Public employers are constrained by
the Constitution.
Privacy106 and the constitutional protections of the fourth amend-
ment10 7 have been the focus of many of the court battles over
screening of employees. Most of these battles have taken place be-
tween the government and its employees, in part because private
sector employees seeking constitutional protection of privacy rights
105. See Rothstein, supra note 76, at 435 (potential causes of substance use in the
workplace include stress, repetitive work and boredom).
106. As a group, the following articles trace the development of the notion of
individual privacy in an ever more industrialized, impersonal society. See Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962,
963 (1964) (proposing a general theory of individual privacy to reconcile various
theories of legal development); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34, 35
(1967) (providing an account of the various uses of the word privacy); Hermann,
Privacy, the Prospective Employee and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and
Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 77 (1971) (discussion of privacy cases); Note,
Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota As a Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 164-75
(1978) (describing privacy in a sociopsychological context). See generally Prosser, Pri-
vacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960) (discussion of privacy in connection with a famous
person); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (exten-
sive discussion of the privacy right).
107. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1986) (state
racing commission's random selection ofjockeys for drug testing qualifies as an ad-
ministrative search exception to the fourth amendment's requirement for warrant),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513 (urinalysis of city fire
fighters constitutes a search under the fourth amendment);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.
Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986) (firing of bus attendant based on a positive
urinalysis was a violation of fourth amendment right against warrantless searches);
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-91 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (unwarranted
urinalysis of municipal utility employees not a violation of fourth amendment);
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (random urinalysis
of state prison inmates not a violation of fourth amendment if conducted in a reason-
able manner); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (urine testing of police officers constitutes a justified search under rea-
sonable suspicion standard, which is something less than the probable cause stan-
dard); In re Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d
35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889-90 (1986) (school district's requirement that teachers
seeking tenure submit urine samples was an unconstitutional search under the fourth
amendment). Cf Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (firing
of fire fighter after refusing to submit to urinalysis did not constitute a search under
the fourth amendment because plaintiff never took the ordered test).
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have a difficult time meeting the requirement of state action.108
While results of public sector cases on screening have little direct
impact on either union or at will employers, 109 trends and reasoning
from public sector cases tend to flow into other segments of the la-
bor market. I 10
A. Public Sector Employees
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... "I 1 The primary purpose of the
fourth amendment is to safeguard individual privacy and security by
imposing a standard of reasonableness on the actions of government
officials.112 In analyzing fourth amendment issues in substance
screening cases, courts have balanced the employee's expectation of
privacy against the employer's need for testing.'13 This balancing
test has often triggered application of a modified search and seizure
analysis 114 and has resulted in decisions halting programs that were
108. See Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 60 (state action requirement may not be
safe harbor for private sector employers).
109. See generally Comment, supra note 16, at 651-91.
110. Ver Ploeg, supra note 31, at 17 (guidelines established in the public sector
have a way of drifting into the private sector); Comment, supra note 16, at 691.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112. See Miller, supra note 15, at 212.
113. See Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 733-36.
114. Miller, supra note 15, at 216-18. In applying a search and seizure analysis,
courts must first determine whether an individual has a constitutionally protected
interest at stake. That determination consists of a two-pronged analysis. Initially, the
court must determine whether or not the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Then the court must determine if that expectation is one society is willing to
recognize. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). In determining whether an expectation of privacy exists, courts have used an
objective standard based on society's recognition of a legitimate privacy expectation
in the area involved. Miller, supra note 15, at 213 n.50.
Second, the reasonableness of the intrusion is appraised. In assessing the rea-
sonableness of the intrusion of random substance screening, courts have adopted the
factors set out in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Schmerber court
relied heavily on the fact that the blood sample was being taken by professional medi-
cal personnel in a hospital. Id. at 771-72. Urinalysis screens are rarely given by
highly trained workers. That is part of their attractiveness; you don't have to spend
very much money to open a testing lab. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518
F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (challenge to the U.S. Army's screening program); Capua,
643 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (fire department conducted mass urinalysis testing using
bonded testing agents provided by the city);Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1502-03 (employer
required urinalysis as part of standard physical examination); Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp.
at 1094-95 (racing commission used Breathalyzer and had jockeys urinate into bot-
tles to be tested at an independent laboratory); Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 484 (employees
urinated into jars and employer sent jars away for analysis).
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particularly egregious in violating employee rights.' 15
The ultimate determination of a search's reasonableness requires a
judicious balancing of the intrusiveness of the search against its pro-
motion of a legitimate employer interest.116 The factors courts have
fashioned for determining the reasonableness of testing can be ex-
pressed as follows: 1) the likelihood that intoxication will be found is
high, or actual intoxication is extremely hazardous; 2) the testing
procedures are reliable; and 3) the manner of test administration
would not be repugnant to the average person.'i
7
B. Private Sector, Unionized Employees
Occupying a middle ground in the screening continuum is the pri-
vate sector employer who has signed a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Unionized businesses, while generally not bound by
constitutional standards, usually are limited in their actions toward
employees by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."i 8
Labor agreements generally require employers to bargain for
changes in working conditions.' 9
Although there is no uniformity in the decisions, courts approach-
ing the issue of substance screening in the union context have gener-
ally held that these programs must be implemented within the
guidelines of the bargaining agreement.' 20 Some courts have
granted injunctions prohibiting implementation until the parties
have agreed on the details of the program.121 Other courts have al-
lowed the implementation of a program subject to the final results of
the bargaining process.122 Still other courts have allowed implemen-
tation and held that employees must exhaust their administrative
remedies before judicial review will be available.123
115. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 732. But see McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302,
1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing a restricted random testing system).
116. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513-14. See also Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 387.
117. See, e.g., Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 731-37 (discussion of government's rea-
sons for wanting urinalysis testing and the court's reasons for holding that such test-
ing was unconstitutional in this case). See also Ayers, supra note 20, at 347-48.
118. See Schmedemann, supra note 21, at 280-81.
119. See, e.g., Association of Western Pulp & Paper Workers v. Boise Cascade Co.,
644 F. Supp. 183, 185 (D. Or. 1986). See also Schmedemann, supra note 21, at -.
120. See, e.g., International B'hd of Elec. Workers v. Metropolitan Edison, No. 86-
4426 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1986).
121. See, e.g., International B'hd of Elec. Workers v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634
F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
122. See Brotherhood of Maintenance of The Way Employees v. Burlington N.
R.R., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
123. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642, 653
(D.D.C. 1986), rev'd &remanded, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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C. At Will Employees
The Bill of Rights does not protect an individual from the acts of
another individual, or from the acts of a business. At will employers
are generally not subject to constitutional standards in their actions
toward employees.124 Constitutionally, the at will employer may
screen employees at any time.
At will employees have relatively few protections from the actions
of employers.125 In very general terms, the at will employer may hire
or fire for good reason, for no reason, or for a reason that is morally
wrong.' 26 Thus, it appears that an at will employer may discharge an
employee for refusing to submit to, 1 2 7 or failing a substance
screen. 128
Under the at will rule, absent statutory restrictions,129 an employer
has an unfettered hand in hiring and firing. In pre-employment situ-
ations, absent a statute, the employer is free to ask virtually any ques-
tion designed to elicit almost any information, even if it can only be
revealed through a pre-employment physical. Prospective employ-
ees are free to refuse to divulge any information, just as the em-
ployer is free to refuse to hire that person.130
IV. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF AT WILL EMPLOYERS IN INSTITUTING
SUBSTANCE SCREENING
At will employers who have initiated substance screening pro-
124. See generally Blades, supra note 23. But see Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 60
(when private conduct flagrantly abuses constitutional rights the judiciary will find
ways to circumvent the state action requirement).
125. See generally Blades, supra note 23.
126. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 533-35, 179 S.W. 134, 137-38 (1915).
127. See King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680-81 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986), aff'd sub nom., Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840, 514 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704,
507 N.E.2d 296, 297 (1987).
128. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359,
1360 (1986) (an employee who was fired after failing both intitial and confirmatory
test had no cause of action against his employer).
129. See, e.g., The National Labor Relations (Warner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1982) (protecting employees engaged in concerted activity); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982) (prohibiting age discrimina-
tion); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982)
(providing employment advancement for veterans); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment);
MINN. STAT. §§ 268.08-.09 (1986) (maximum unemployment benefits provided to
employees fired without cause). All states except Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mis-
sissippi and Tennessee have statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment.
130. See Rothstein, supra note 76, at 427-28.
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grams have found themselves in court.'13 As workplace screening
for substance use spreads and lawyers become more attuned to the
issues presented by such programs, the number of lawsuits is sure to
rise. 13 2 The at will employer who relies on the at will doctrine as the
basis of a defense against an employee's suit arising out of a screen is
apt to wind up on the losing side of the lawsuit.133
At will employers instituting urinalysis substance screening pro-
grams may face liability in several areas. First, employers may face
liability because courts have created contractual modifications of the
at will relationship.134 Second, an employer may face a variety of
potential liabilities arising out of tort causes of action.'85 Finally, an
employer could face liability in the implementation of a screening
program based on a statutory cause of action.136
A. Contract Based Modifications of the At Will Relationship
1. Implied-in-Fact Modifications
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized implied-in-fact
modifications of the at will relationship through the distribution of
employee handbooks.'3 7 In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,13 8 the
court construed the distribution of employee handbooks as the offer
of a unilateral contract that employees accepted by continuing in
theirjobs.139 The court held that since the handbook provisions met
unilateral contract standards they were binding on the employer.140
An employer does, however, have the right to modify handbook pro-
visions at any time by distributing modifications to employees.14'
An employer contemplating urinalysis substance screening of em-
ployees should look at the language of any handbook distributed to
employees. When handbook provisions that meet unilateral contract
standards delineate work conditions or disciplinary procedures that
would hamper the institution of the screening program, both the
handbook and the program design should be re-evaluated. 142 If af-
131. See, e.g., Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976) (defamation action) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
132. See D'Aquila, supra note 44, at 6.
133. See, e.g., Whery, 548 S.W.2d 743.
134. See infra notes 137-61 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 162-215 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 216-83 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389
N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 1986) (language in employee handbook held sufficient to
constitute an offer that ripened into a binding unilateral contract upon acceptance).
138. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
139. Id. at 630.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 627.
142. This re-evaluation should ask at least three questions:
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ter re-evaluation it is determined that handbook language still may
hamper program implementation, the handbook may be modified by
distributing the modification to employees.
In Eklund v. Vincent Brass and Aluminum Co. ,143 the Minnesota Court
of Appeals recognized that circumstances and acts of parties may
give rise to an implied-in-fact covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in an employment contract. 14 4 The covenant is largely a require-
ment of fairness. If the screening of an employee was fair under the
circumstances, then the covenant was not breached. Conversely, if
screening of the employee was unfair, then the covenant was
breached. 145
In Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, Inc. 146 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized another contractually based modification of the at
will relationship. In Bussard, the court held that when an employee
contributes consideration in addition to continued labor, the at will
relationship can be contractually modified so as to require good
cause for discharge. 147 The at will employer may confront this situa-
tion when one business takes over another. In that situation, imple-
mentation of a screening program must heed the limits of the
purchase agreement and any contemporaneous oral promises. 148
1. Is there something fundamentally wrong with the screening program?
2. Is there something fundamentally wrong with the handbook?
3. Do the handbook and the screening program conform with the statutory
guidelines?
See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. A problem with the program design
or a conflict with a statute is a clear warning that the entire motivation for screening
should be reconsidered. See supra notes 24-61 and accompanying text.
143. 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
144. Id. at 378. But see Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986) (refusing to imply a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in employment contracts). The implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing originally arose in the context of insurance contracts. Under this principle, an
insurer is liable for a breach of its duty to settle an insured's claim in good faith. See,
e.g., Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978); Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis.2d
615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979). The concept has gradually come to be applied in other
contexts, including the at will relationship. Marrinan, Employment At-Will: Pandora's
Box May Have An Attractive Cover, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 155, 175 (1984). See Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839,
841 (1980); Abbasi, Hollman & Murrey, Employment At Will: An Eroding Concept in Em-
ployment Relationships, 38 LAB. L.J. 21, 25-26 (1987).
145. See Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 76.
146. 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972).
147. Id. at 223, 200 N.W.2d at 161.
148. See Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 75. In this situation there are two groups
of employees who will need to be considered. The first is a former owner who agrees
to become an employee. Often in such cases, one of the considerations of the former
owner is a desire to have employment for an indefinite period. A change in the con-
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2. Implied-In-Law Modifications
In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,149 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized an exception to the employment at will doctrine
based on principles of promissory estoppel.150 Promissory estoppel
is largely a doctrine of reliance.151 When an employee takes action
in reasonable reliance on an employer's representations, the em-
ployer is bound by those statements. Principles of promissory estop-
pel will apply in situations where the employer has made
representations about future plans to implement a screening pro-
gram or the intended use of results.152
If an employer makes assurances to employees that no screening
program will be implemented, the employer may be bound by those
representations. Particularly when an employee has refused other
work opportunities, an employer who institutes screening after
promising not to do so will face liability based on promissory estop-
pel. Similarly, an employer who begins disciplining employees based
on screen results after promising not to do so, will also face liability.
Employers often require job applicants to submit to pre-employ-
ment screens.1 53 Employers need to be cautious about making
promises of hiring to job applicants before requesting a screen.154
Employers utilizing pre-employment screening must take particular
care when hiring workers, before screen results are known, to com-
municate to the prospective employee that any continued employ-
ment is contingent on the screen result. 155 An employee who is not
ditions of work such as a substance screening policy may be a breach of the contract
for the sale of the business. The second group of employees are those who worked
for the former owner and continue to work for the new owner. Frequently, when a
business is sold, promises are made to employees to keep them on the job. These
promises should also be analyzed. See also infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
149. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
150. Id. at 116.
151. Id. When a promise induces action or forbearance, courts will enforce the
promise to avoid injustice. Id. at 116 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1932)). When a party does not act in reliance there will be no action for promissory
estoppel because the elements of the action will be missing. Id.
152. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 75-76. For example, if an employer promised
that no screening program would be instituted and later began a screening program,
the employees who remained working based on the promise would likely have a
cause of action if terminated for refusing to participate. Similarly, if an employee was
informed that no discipline would be imposed for failing a screen but then was dis-
charged, a cause of action would probably exist.
153. See Spitzer, supra note 66, at 21.
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 75-76. An employer may require screening of
prospective employees if an offer of employment has been made and screening is
required of all applicants who have similarly received job offers. See Act approved
June 3, 1987, ch. 388, § 2, subd. 2, 1987 Minn. Laws 2931, 2932 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 181.951, subd. 2).
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so informed and relies on statements about being hired may have
grounds for suit if not hired on the basis of a screen result.156
Another implied-in-law cause of action is the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The Minnesota Supreme Court has been
steadfast in refusing to read an implied-in-law covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into the at will employment relationship.157 Simi-
larly, the court has been unwilling to recognize an implied-in-law
covenant to discharge in good faith or only for good cause.' 58 These
implied-in-law covenants have, however, been recognized in other
jurisdictions.159 The Minnesota Supreme Court's past refusal to rec-
ognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the at
will relationship suggests, but does not assure, that it will continue to
do so.160 Accordingly, employers instituting a screening program
should insure that the program is administered fairly.161
B. Tort Liability
1. Public Policy Exception
In most jurisdictions, the major exception to the at will doctrine is
the public policy exception.162 The public policy exception, recog-
nized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refin-
ing Corp.,163 is an action based in tort.1 64 The cause of action is for
156. See Bensinger, supra note 26, at 10 (speaking of employees). See also Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 601, 292 N.W.2d 880, 893 (1980)
(where employee manual promised fair, reasonable corrective discipline and to re-
lease employees for just cause only, employees could justifiably rely on those
expressions).
157. See Hunt, 384 N.W.2d at 858-59.
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 171-72, 610 P.2d at 1332-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
841-42 (1980) (employer does not enjoy an absolute right to discharge even an at will
employee); Cleary v. American Airlines Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d. 434, 451-55, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 726-28 (1980) (fact that employment contract is terminable at will does
not give employer absolute right to terminate in all cases).
160. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. The court of appeals has rec-
ognized the implied-in-fact covenant. See Eklund, 351 N.W.2d at 378. It may be but a
small step to an implied-in-law covenant.
161. See Alcohol & Drugs, supra note 8, at 76-77.
162. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986), aff'das modified, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987). A majority of the states recog-
nize some form of wrongful discharge. Id. at n.2. The public policy exception to the
at will rule is probably the most recognized exception. Public policy cases usually
arise because an employee is fired for taking an action that falls in one of three cate-
gories: refusing to commit an illegal act, performing a public obligation, or exercis-
ing a legal right. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of lWrongful Discharge -A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 6-7 (1984).
163. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
164. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d 588, 592-93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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wrongful termination.165 The public policy exception has been
adopted to balance the interests of employees, employers, and soci-
ety. 166 Courts have recognized society's interest in not allowing em-
ployers to require employees' participation in unlawful acts. 16 7 In
Phipps, the Minnesota Court of Appeals said that "[a] public policy
exception can be reasonably defined by reference to clear mandates
of legislative or judicially recognized public policy."168 The court
held that the initial burden of proving a dismissal for a reason in
violation of public policy is on the employee.169 The burden then
shifts to the employer to prove that the discharge was based on rea-
sons other than those alleged by the employee.1
70
Phipps opens a door to potential employer liability in substance
screening cases. Although the issues in Phipps are focused on an em-
ployee's refusal to act contrary to a statute, 17 1 the decision leaves
open the possibility of a wider application of the public policy excep-
tion. For example, if a screening program that does not conform to
the statutory guidelines is instituted and an employee refuses to par-
ticipate because of a belief that the program is contrary to the law,
the employee could bring an action for wrongful discharge if termi-
nated based on that belief.172 Less obvious is the possibility of a suit
165. Id. at 593. See also Recent Developments in Minnesota Law, 14 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 193, 213 (1988) [hereinafter Recent Developments] (discussing burden of proof in
public policy cases).
166. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 592.
167. Id. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision on a statute
granting an action for wrongful termination, the court did not specifically deal with
the policy reasons allowing such a cause of action. See MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (Supp.
1987) (allowing action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy); Recent
Developments, supra note 165, at 212-13. The court, in addressing the punitive dam-
ages issue, said, "[i]n a nation of laws the mere encouragement that one violate the
law is unsavory; the threat of retaliation for refusing to do so is intolerable and im-
permissible." Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572 (citation omitted).
168. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 593. The supreme court's deferral to the statute, see
supra note 167, leaves open the question of where public policy is to be found. The
major difficulty in public policy theory is determining what expression of public pol-
icy will be strong enough to support a wrongful discharge cause of action. Lopatka,
supra note 162, at 13. One court found strong public policy in the first amendment's
protection of speech. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir.
1983). In view of the statute, it is unlikely that the Minnesota courts would go so far
as to constitutionalize the private sector workplace, but this has been suggested by
some commentators. See, e.g., AURTHUR SELWYN MILLER, "CONSTITUTIONALIZING"
THE SUPERCORPORATIONS (1986) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). See
also infra note 172.
169. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572.
170. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 592; Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572.
171. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 593-94.
172. The employee may be able to elect what statute to proceed under. The drug
testing statute provides remedies for breach of the statute. See D'Aquila, Drug and
Alcohol Testing In the Workplace, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255 (1988).
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filed by an employee because of a mistaken belief that the program is
either illegal or unconstitutional.17
3
2. Invasion of Privacy
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 174 section 652B establishes a
cause of action for invasion of privacy. Section 652B reads: "One
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person."1 7 5 Minnesota has not
yet recognized an invasion of privacy cause of action.176
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 177 the court construed
the plaintiffs' complaint to allege an invasion of privacy based on
publication of private facts arising out of a termination prompted by
a positive random urinalysis screen result.17 8 The court said that in
such an action, the plaintiff has the burden of proof "to show a bla-
tant and shocking disregard of his rights, and serious mental or phys-
173. The Phipps court of appeals decision used language that indicated a constitu-
tion could express public policy. Id. at 592. The statute provides that an employee
cannot be fired for refusing to "participate in any activity that the employee, in good
faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule." MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (Supp.
1987) (emphasis added). The statute invokes the standard of a good faith belief by
the employee that the act is prohibited. Many people believe that the Constitution
protects individuals from the actions of employers. See supra notes 133-35 and ac-
companying text. If the belief of the employee is an honest one, it is difficult to
believe that the act (or refusal to act) would not be one of good faith, despite the
inaccuracy of the belief. The statute does not require that the employee be correct in
the belief. See also Recent Developments, supra note 165, at 214-15. The issue may arise
at some point unless employers are careful to explain not only the procedures of a
testing program, but also the legal authority to test. See MINN. STAT. § 181.952 subd.
2 (Supp. 1987) (requiring employers to distribute screening guidelines to employees
prior to institution of screening program).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
175. Id. Public sector decisions have held that the administration of a urinalysis
test is an offensive invasion of privacy. "Urine testing involves one of the most pri-
vate of functions, a function traditionally performed in private, and indeed, usually
prohibited in public." Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1507. See supra notes 111-17 and ac-
companying text.
176. Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); House
v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). It may
be that the appropriate case to recognize the tort has not yet been brought before a
Minnesota appellate court. Both decisions remarked that the facts were not such as
to recognize the cause of action. Hendry, 303 Minn. at 319, 226 N.W.2d at 923; House,
351 N.W.2d at 685. Hendry involved publication of facts already public and publicity
which was not undue or oppressive. Hendry, 303 Minn. at.319, 226 N.W.2d at 923.
House involved a claim for appropriation of likeness in which consent was given.
House, 351 N.W.2d at 685.
177. 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
178. Id. at 1369.
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ical injury or humiliation."179 The court did not, however, find an
invasion of privacy cause of action based on an intrusion in the ad-
mininstration of the screen.' 8 0
Commentators have frequently compared the administration of a
polygraph examination to the administration of a urinalysis test.' 8 '
It is clear that a polygraph examination is an invasion of an individ-
ual's rights.182 Similarly, administering a urinalysis test may amount
to a deliberate invasion of the individual's zone of privacy.18 3
179. Id. at 1370 (citing Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C.
1966)).
180. Id. The court construed the complaint as an action based on the public dis-
closure of private facts. In refusing to recognize this as a cause of action, the court
noted that Satterfield conceded that the positive result was not communicated to the
general public. Id.
181. Note, supra note 13, at 277-78. Polygraph examinations measure changes in
respiration, heart rate, blood pressure and skin conductivity. Comment, supra note
29, at 397 (citing Perez-Reyes, Passive Inhalation of Marajuana Smoke and Urinary Excre-
tion ofCannabinoids, 249J.A.M.A. 475 (1983)). These bodily processes are presumed
to change when an individual is not telling the truth. See id. See generally Lykken,
Polygraph Tests in Business Unscientific, Unamerican, Illegal, HENNEPIN LAw. May-June
1976, at 4; Note, The Presidential Polygraph Order and the Fourth Amendment: Subjecting
Federal Employees to Warrantless Searches, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 896, 902 (1984).
Minnesota Statute section 181.75 prohibits an employer from asking an em-
ployee to take a polygraph. MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1986). The statute makes it a
misdemeanor to convey the results of such a test to anyone other than persons au-
thorized by the testee. Id. § 181.76 (1986) ("no person shall disclose that another
person has taken a polygraph or any test purporting to test honesty or the results of
that test except to the individual tested"). Section 181.76 has been interpreted as
conferring no private cause of action. See Jeffers v. Conroy Co., 636 F. Supp. 1337,
1341-42 (D. Minn. 1986) (no claim recognized based on invasion of privacy). The
Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted section 181.75 to be inapplicable to tests
that do not purport to measure physiological changes. See Spannaus v. Century Cam-
era, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981).
Urinalysis screens detect the metabolites of chemicals introduced into the body.
See Note, supra at 902. The production and elimination of metabolites is a physiologi-
cal process. See id. at 902-03. Thus, urine screens would seem to measure physiolog-
ical changes.
Despite the differences between drug screens and polygraphs, both can be said
to measure a person's honesty. An example of this is an employer testing for drug
use after an employee denies using drugs.
More important than the specific language of the polygraph statute is the policy
message it conveys. See Note, supra note 13, at 276-80 (discussing the public policy
rationale behind statutes restricting the use of polygraphs). The policy message is
that employees have a right to be free from unreasonable invasions of privacy by
their employers. Further, the statute is consistent with the policy that tests with in-
herent defects in accuracy are prima facie unreasonable invasions of privacy.
182. See Note, supra note 13, at 277-78. Nineteen states and the District ofColum-
bia restrict the use of polygraphs in the employment context. Twenty-seven states
require polygraph examiners to be licensed. Id. at 278 n.63. See also supra note 181
and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 1 I 1-17 and accompanying text. In State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963), the Minnesota
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3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Hubbard v. United Press Interna-
tional.18 4 The court, drawing from the Restatement of Torts, stated the
elements necessary for a claim as: 1) extreme and outrageous con-
duct; 2) that is intentional or reckless; and, 3) causes severe emo-
tional distress.i85 The court limited the operation of this tort to
cases involving particularly egregious facts.186
Consent is coerced when an employee's only other options are to
quit or be discharged.187 Consent, however, may not be valid when
it is coerced.88 Employers who coerce consent to urinalysis may be
intentionally inflicting emotional distress on employees and expos-
ing themselves to sizeable damage awards.i89 If the employer is lia-
ble, then any lasting negative psychological consequences of the
urinalysis experience will be compensable. In a case involving a par-
ticularly sensitive employee the damages could be substantial.90
Employers acknowledge that one of the major reasons for institut-
ing a substance screening program is to coerce employees who are
currently abusing substances to cease that abuse. 191 Coercion of em-
ployee actions that are not related to job performance could be con-
sidered outrageous. Innocent employees may suffer severe
Supreme Court recognized that damages were recoverable for actions "constituting a
direct invasion of the plaintiff's rights." Id. at 368, 122 N.W.2d at 41. The plaintiff
was attempting to recover damages for mental anguish attributable to the physical
condition of her husband as a result of an auto accident. The court declined to award
her damages because her rights were not invaded. As examples of direct invasions of
an individual's rights, the court listed "slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduc-
tion, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious miscohduct." Id.
State Farm was cited by the court in Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d
108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), in affirming a judgment against an employer who had
given an employee a polygraph exam in violation of a statute. Id. at 111-12. The
plaintiff in Kamrath based her claim on the violation of the statute prohibiting em-
ployers from asking employees to take a polygraph exam. See MINN. STAT. § 181.75,
subd. 1 (1986) ("No employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly solicit or
require a polygraph, voice stress analysis, or any test purporting to test the honesty
of any employee or prospective employee."). See also Spannaus, 309 N.W.2d 735
(Minn. 1981) (upholding the constitutionality of this statute).
184. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). Hubbard was an alcoholic, and he alleged
that U.P.I. discriminated against him on the basis of his alcoholism. Id. at 431. See
also infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text (discussion of discrimination against
handicapped persons).
185. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 438-39.
186. See id. at 439.
187. See Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 736.
188. See id.
189. See Kamrath, 363 N.W.2d at 111-12.
190. See id.
191. See Hoffer, supra note 45, at 58.
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emotional distress when confronted with employer mandated
screening programs. Therefore, employers who institute random
substance screening programs may be vulnerable to intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claims.19 2
4. Defamation
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized defamation claims
in the employment context in a series of recent decisions.t93 For a
statement to be defamatory, "it must be communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff, it must be false, and it must tend to harm the
plaintiff's reputation and to lower him or her in the estimation of the
community."194 Communication between two company employees,
even when both employees need to know the information, can con-
stitute publication.195 One defense to a defamation action is an em-
ployer's qualified privilege to communicate relevant information. 196
This defense will be lost if the employee proves actual malice.197
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. Wherry 198 and O'Brien v. Papa
Gino's of America, Inc. 199 are two cases in which employers were held
liable for defamation following tests that the employees allegedly
failed. In both cases, the tests were given to determine whether the
employees were using drugs. In O'Brien, the test was a polygraph
exam 200 and in Wherry the test was a urinalysis screen.201 In each
case, the court allowed substantial damages.202 Wherry, in particular,
192. See generally Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The decision, while based on libel and slander, reads much
like an intentional infliction of emotional distress case. Wherry was discharged on
the basis of an inaccurate urinalysis, which the company knew was inaccurate. Id. at
746-47. See also Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (recognizing cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
193. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987);
Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986); Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Bohdan, 411
N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
194. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886.
195. Frankson, 394 N.W.2d at 144.
196. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890.
197. Id. The court said that the common law defintion of malice is appropriate in
the employment context. Common law malice exists, according to the court, when
an employer makes statements "from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff." Id. at 891 (quoting
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980)).
198. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex Civ. App. 1977).
199. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
200. Id. at 1070. O'Brien took a polygraph because he had been accused of drug
use. Id.
201. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d at 746.
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points out the problems inherent in conveying information gathered
from a urinalysis substance screen.203 Employers could face substan-
tial damage awards when an employee is mistakenly dismissed on the
basis of an inaccurate screen.
5. Negligence
Any suit that arises out of the administration of a urinalysis sub-
stance screen will likely include a claim alleging negligence. To es-
tablish a negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, that
the plaintiff was, in fact, injured, and that the breach was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's injury.204
Employer liability can arise from negligent testing or negligent
evaluation of a screen.20 5 A claim for negligent testing will arise
when: 1) the entity doing the screening knows the test is for a seri-
ous purpose; 2) the employer relies on the screen in taking action;
and, 3) the employee's termination results from reliance on the
screen results.206 Negligent evaluation occurs when a negligent act
yields erroneous data,207 or when correct data is negligently
interpreted.208
When a screen has been given or interpreted negligently there is a
possibility that a cause of action for medical malpractice may
arise.209 The concept of medical malpractice applies to derelictions
by someone engaged in health care services.2 10 The absence of priv-
ity of contract does not bar the physician-patient relationship.21i Ar-
203. The tests themselves are inherently inaccurate and the results subject to dif-
ferent interpretations, at least in part dependent on the skill of technicians. See
Wherry, 548 S.W.2d at 746. Even assuming the tests are 95% accurate, the potential
impact on innocent workers is drastically minimized. Assuming that 5% of a popula-
tion of 1,000 use substances, 50 people should be detected through screening. In
actuality, 47 innocent people will be accused of substance use and may lose their
jobs, while 3 people using substances will go undetected and will retain their jobs.
See INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (BNA) 8 (1986).
204. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982) (quoting
Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells, 243 Minn. 289, 292, 67 N.W.2d 644,
646 (1954)).
205. Herman & Bernholz, Negligence in Employee Drug Testing, 92 CASE & COMMENT,
July-Aug. 1987 at 3.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 3 (citing Zampatori v. United Parcel Service, 125 Misc. 2d 405, 479
N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)) (suit filed against a detective agency that gave
polygraph test for the employer).
208. See Herman & Bernholz, supra note 206, at 4.
209. See generally Rothstein, Legal Issues in the Medical Assessment of Physical Impairment
by Third-Party Physicians, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 503 (1984) (discussing the possible physi-
cian-patient relationship that arises when a third party supplies the physician).
210. 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 63 at 456 (1987).
211. See Beadling v. Sirotta, 71 N.J. Super. Ct. 182, 176 A.2d 546, 549 (Law Div.
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guably, by instituting a screening program an employer is
undertaking to evaluate an employee's substance use. If that evalua-
tion is not done with proper care 2 12 the employer may be faced with
satisfying a medical malpractice judgment.213 The damages from
such a claim could be significant.214 This cause of action has been
precluded in terms of employer liability by Minnesota's screening
statute.2 1 5
C. Statutory Liability
Most of the erosion of the employment at will doctrine has been
accomplished by statute.2 1 6 Recently, Minnesota passed legislation
that limits the use of screening and prescribes permissable methods
of screening employees. 2 17 Other statutes may also have an impact
on an employer's decisions to hire, fire, or test employees and job
applicants. 21 8
1961) (absence of express contract does not bar physician-patient relationship; issue
of whether physician was an agent of the employer is a question of fact). But see
Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 122 11. App. 3d 376, 461 N.E.2d 531 (1984)
(failure of company doctor to correctly diagnose lung cancer resulted in injury that
arose out of course of employment, barring action for medical malpractice under
exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation act). Cf. Lodico v. Cohn, 132
Misc. 2d 866, 505 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (physician-patient relationship
arises out of examination in connection with workers' compensation claim).
212. See Chiasera v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 101 Misc. 2d 877,
878, 422 N.Y.S.2d 341, 342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (liability will arise out of the neg-
lience principle that one who undertakes to act is subject to take reasonable care in
the undertaking).
213. See, e.g., Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1979) (em-
ployer liable for employee who negligently started fire); Lange v. National Biscuit
Co., 297 Minn. 399, 211 N.W.2d 783 (1973) (employer liable when source of assault
related to employee's duties); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neu-
rology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306 (1982) (employer liable when psychologists engaged in
sex acts with patients).
214. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d
813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (erroneous diagnosis of venereal disease lead to al-
lowance of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental suffering,
medical expenses associated with marriage counseling, and loss of consortium).
215. See MINN. STAT. § 181.953 subd. 1 (Supp. 1987). The statutory requirement
that employers not test their own employees inserts an independent contractor into
the testing scheme and thereby vitiates any respondeat superior liability. It probably
would not vitiate a suit based on a theory of negligent selection of a testing company.
216. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1986) (the Minnesota Human Rights Act
spells out a wide range of factors, including race and sex, which cannot be considered
in hiring or firing). Under a strict at will doctrine, any factor could be considered.
217. See MINN. STAT. §§ 181.950-957 (Supp. 1987).
218. See supra note 129 (citing federal statutes). See also MINN. STAT. §§ 181.931-
.935 (Supp. 1987) ("whistle blower" statute protects employees who report sus-
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1. Discrimination
a. Race
Both state and federal legislation prohibit employers from discrim-
inating on the basis of race. 21 9 In the screening context, employers
may run afoul of discrimination statutes because of the disparate ef-
fects of screening on minority candidates.220 Disparate effects may
arise in two ways. First, substance use appears to be more prevalent
in minority communities.221 Second, minorities are more likely vic-
tims of false positive results.222 I
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,2 23 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the discharge of employees for methadone
use.224 The Court held that disparate impact on a racial group will
not support a claim of racial discrimination when a work rule is
safety-related rather than motivated by discriminatory intent.225 The
court found that the rule had a rational basis and had been applied
without discriminatory intent.226 Following this analysis, a screening
program that is motivated by safety considerations is unlikely to be
found discriminatory. In programs that do not run follow-up tests,
however, there is a possibility of disparate impact claims arising from
flaws in screen procedures.227
b. Handicap
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973228 protects handicapped individu-
als from employment discrimination by government agencies or em-
ployers who receive federal funds.229 In 1978, Congress amended
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982); MINN. STAT. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1987).
220. Disparate impact is the concept that, although certain criteria are neutral on
their face, minorities are adversely affected when they are applied. See generally
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (landmark decision applying dispa-
rate impact analysis).
221. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Bleazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1979).
222. D'Aquila, supra note 44, at 22. The argument is that urine tests falsely iden-
tify blacks as marijuana users because urine contains melanin, a substance responsi-
ble for skin pigmentation, that closely resembles marijuana metabolites. Id. See also
Wilson, From Aids to Z." A Primer for Legal Issues Concerning Aids, Drugs, and Alcohol in the
Workplace, 2 LAB. LAw. 631, 659 (1986).
223. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
224. Id. at 570-71.
225. Id. at 587 (even if it is capable of establishing a primafacie case of discrimina-
tion, it is assuredly rebutted by the Transit Authority's demonstration that its rule
prohibiting narcotic use is job-related).
226. Id.
227. The flaw arises because many employers simply do not confirm testing.
Note, supra note 13, at 275-76.
228. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 793, subd. a (1982) (any contract entered into by any Federal
department or agency over certain dollar amount imposes affirmative action rquire-
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the definition of 'handicapped' in the Rehabilitaion Act to exclude
individuals "whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such in-
dividual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others."2 3o
In Johnson v. Smith,231 a United States District Court applied the
Rehabilitation Act in Minnesota. In July 1983, the plaintiff applied
for a job as a correctional officer at the federal prison camp in Du-
luth. The Bureau of Prisons gave the plaintiff a rating of 95 on a
scale of 100, based on a personal qualifications statement he had
filled out. Prior to an interview, the plaintiff filled out an interview
questionnaire. In the questionnaire, the plaintiff admitted a history
of alcohol and drug abuse that ended with his treatment for chemical
dependency in 1977.232
The plaintiff alleged that his prior alcohol and drug use was the
focus of his interview. The plaintiff was notified that he had been
removed from consideration for the job because of his history of sub-
stance dependency. The plaintiff filed suit alleging deprivation of a
property interest contrary to the fifth amendment233 and discrimina-
tion under the Rehabilitation Act. The Federal Bureau of Prisons
moved for summary judgment.234
The Johnson court granted summary judgment as to the fifth
amendment claim, but denied summary judgment on the Rehabilita-
tion Act claim.235 The court held that the plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case under the Act,236 and the burden of proof then
shifted to the defendant to rebut the inference that employment was
denied because of the handicap.237 The court said that because
questions still remained as to whether the plaintiff was as well quali-
ment"); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (prohibiting exclusion of qualified handicapped indi-
viduals from participation in federally assisted program).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 706, subd. 7(B) (1982).
231. 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1106 (BNA) (D.C. Minn. 1985).
232. Id. at 1107. The plaintiff admitted to use of marijuana daily from 1969-1977,
speed 50-70 times, L.S.D. 10 times, hashish 50-100 times, downers 5 times and alco-
hol frequently. Id. He had remained clean since his treatment at Duluth's Miller
Davis Hospital, for chemical dependency. Id.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "No per-
son . . . shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. " The plaintiff alleged that he had a property interest in his right to apply for
the job. Johnson, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1108.
234. Id. at 1107.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court cited Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981), in
holding that the plaintiff had made a primafacie case by showing that he was a handi-
capped person under the Act, qualified apart from his handicap and denied employ-
ment because of his handicap. Johnson, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1107.
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fled as other applicants for the job and whether his handicap would
prevent him from doing the job, summary judgment must be
denied. 2
38
Johnson is important in the screening context. The simple showing
of substance use will not permit an employer to discharge an em-
ployee. The employer must also show that the employee poses a
direct threat to property or the safety of others, or that the substance
use impacts on job performance.239
If an employee's job performance has been satisfactory and the job
does not impact on safety, the employee can be discharged only at a
large risk of employer liability.240 Johnson is also important because
the Minnesota Supreme Court applies principles developed in fed-
eral courts in deciding discrimination claims.241
While the Rehabilitation Act applies only to employers receiving
federal funds, the Minnesota Human Rights Act242 applies to all em-
ployers in Minnesota.243 The language in the pertinent section of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act is virtually identical to that in the
Rehabilitation Act.244 In defining a disability, the Minnesota Human
Rights Act excludes "any condition resulting from alcohol or drug
abuse that prevents a person from performing the essential functions
of the job in question or constitutes a direct threat to property or the
safety of others."245
The Human Rights Act goes further than the Rehabilitation Act
because it prohibits an employer from requiring, before employ-
ment, that a person "furnish information that pertains to ... [a] disa-
bility."246 Minnesota Statute section 363.02 allows employers to
require a physical examination under certain conditions.247 These
238. Johnson, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1107. See also MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd.
5 (Supp. 1987). This is not a significant distinction. Any employee who is a danger to
property or to the safety of others is unable to do the job.
239. Id. The public policy is to encourage the disabled to enter the workplace.
240. See Hubbard v. United Press Internat'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d at 441-42.
241. Id.
242. MINN. STAT. ch. 363 (Supp. 1987).
243. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 15 defines "employer" as "a person who has one
or more employees."
244. 29 U.S.C. § 706, subd. 8(B) (Supp. 1987) states that the definition of a handi-
capped individual:
[D]oes not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose
current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing
the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property
or the safety of others.
Id.
245. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 25a(2) (1986).
246. Id., § 363.03, subd. 1(4)(a) (1986).
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exams are limited to the establishment of job-related ability. They
cannot be used to determine the existence of a disability except to
the extent that the disability prevents the applicant's actual job
performance.248
Both the Rehabilitation Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act
require an employer to "make reasonable accomodation" for the al-
coholic and drug abusing employee.2 49 Although "reasonable ac-
comodation" of an alcoholic or drug abuser has not been defined
with specificity under either Act, there are some general guidelines
employers must follow.250 Job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules and other similiar actions are required by both
Acts.25 1 The Minnesota Human Rights Act accomodation require-
ments apply only to employers with 50 or more full-time employ-
ees.2 52 Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, the duty of accomodation may affect whether and
how a substance abusing employee may be disciplined.253
(i) to require or request a person to undergo physical examination,
which may include a medical history, for the purpose of determining the
person's capability to perform available employment, provided (a) that an
offer of employment has been made on condition that the person meets the
physical or mental requirements of the job; (b) that the examination tests
only for essential job-related abilities; and (c) that the examination, except
for examinations authorized under Chapter 176 is required of all persons
conditionally offered employment for the same position regardless of disa-
bility, or
(ii) with the consent of the employee, to obtain additional medical in-
formation for the purposes of establishing an employee health record;
(iii) to administer preemployment tests, provided that the tests
(a) measure only essential job-related abilities, (b) are required of all appli-
cants for the same position regardless of disability except for tests author-
ized under Chapter 176, and (c) accurately measure the applicant's aptitude,
achievement level, or whatever factors they purport to measure rather than
reflecting the applicant's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, ex-
cept when those skills are the factors that the tests purport to measure...
MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 1(7)(i)-(iii) (Supp. 1987).
248. Id. at (iii).
249. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1986); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(6) (1986). See
also Note, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Ill
Against Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and The Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 742-44 (1983). See generally Spencer, The
Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the Alcoholic, Drug Addicted or Mentally Ill
Employee: An Examination Under Federal and State Employment'Statutes and Arbitration Deci-
sions, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 659 (1979). While an employer may not have to institute
an employee assistance program, an employer might be wise to do so. Id. at 677.
250. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. The first general rule is, sim-
ply, never to discharge an employee solely on the basis of a disability. In other
words, an employer should not discharge on the basis of a positive urinalysis sub-
stance screen. Second, the employer should attempt to accommodate the employee.
251. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(6).
252. MINN. STAT § 363.03, subd. 1(6).
253. See D'Aquila, supra note 44, at 20.
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Given the similarity of the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's def-
erence to federal court interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act,
Minnesota courts are apt to apply the same analysis to drug and alco-
hol abuse cases as was used in Johnson. This means that Minnesota
employers cannot discharge an employee solely because the employee
tests positive on a substance abuse screen.
3. Unemployment Compensation
In instituting screening programs many employers have opted to
terminate employees who fail screens. 2 54 Employers who terminate
employees for testing positive on a screen may face liability for un-
employment compensatin.255 In these cases, it will be necessary for
employers to become aware of standards relating to payment and
denial of benefits and the liability of paying benefits to former
employees.
There are as yet no Minnesota appellate decisions on the grant or
denial of benefits in a case involving substance screening. Two Min-
nesota cases involving use of alcohol and unemployment compensa-
tion are Tilseth v. Midwest Lumber C0.256 and King v. Little Italy.257 A
look at these two cases and decisions from other states specifically
dealing with substance screening is useful in exploring employer lia-
bility for unemployment compensation.
Both Tilseth and King involve the interpretation of the Minnesota
Economic Security Law,2 58 which disqualifies claimants from unem-
ployment benefits for "misconduct.'"259 Disqualifications from bene-
fits for misconduct will be the major issue facing employers when an
employee is discharged in a screening program.2 60 When an em-
ployee is not guilty of misconduct, a discharge will increase an em-
ployer's contribution to the unemployment insurance fund.261 Thus
254. See Note, Other Considerations: Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation,
and Chain of Custody, 23 WILLAME-rrE L. REV. 585, 590 (1987). But see infra notes 312-
13 and accompanying text (new legislation prohibits termination for first positive
test, even if confirmed).
255. See Note, supra note 254, at 590.
256. 295 Minn. 372, 204 N.W.2d 644 (1973).
257. 341 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
258. MINN. STAT. §§ 268.03-268.24.
259. MINN. STAT. § 268.09, subd. (2). See King, 341 N.W.2d at 898; Tilseth, 295
Minn. at 373, 204 N.W.2d at 645.
260. See, e.g., Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Employment Div., 87 Or. App. 152,
741 P.2d 904 (1987); Glide Lumber Products v. Employment Div., 86 Or. App. 669,
741 P.2d 907 (1987); Grinnell v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 732
P.2d 113 (Utah 1987); Blake v. Hercules, Inc., 4 Va. App. 27, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
261. See MINN. STAT. § 268.09.
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the employer's liability for a discharged employee may be indirect,
rather than direct.
In Tilseth the issue was whether consumption of intoxicants by a
truck driver during working hours constituted statutory miscon-
duct. 2 6 2 The employee's only symptom of actual intoxication was
talking loudly and the employer had never curtailed the employee's
driving duties. The employee repeatedly had alcohol on his
breath. 26 3 In Tilseth, the Minnesota Supreme Court for the first time
defined "misconduct" in the unemployment statute by adopting a
three-part test for determining when employee actions constitute
misconduct. 264 Applying the test to the facts, the court held that
"repeated consumption of intoxicants during working hours by a
truckdriver ... does constitute 'misconduct.' "265
In King, the court of appeals adopted the Tilseth standard, noting
that the test had been expanded to include "any actions that demon-
strate a lack of concern for one's job. ' ' 266 Finding that King volunta-
rily reported to work intoxicated,267 the court affirmed the decision
of the Commissioner of Economic Security to deny unemployment
benefits.268
The inability of screens to detect impairment has led to employer
liability for unemployment benefits.269 In Blake v. Hercules, Inc. ,270
262. Tilseth, 295 Minn. at 373, 204 N.W.2d at 645.
263. Id.
264. Id. Conduct is "misconduct" only when it is:
1) wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests, or
2) carelessness or negligence constituting wrongful intent or evil design,
or
3) intentional and substantial disregard of the employee's duties to the
employer.
Id. at 374-75, 204 N.W.2d at 646 (citing Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249,
259, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941)).
The court pointed out that "mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in
good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary
negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are
not to be deemed 'misconduct.'" Id. at 375, 204 N.W.2d at 646.
265. Id.
266. King, 341 N.W.2d at 898.
267. Id. at 899. King was scheduled to have the day off. After receiving a call at
home requesting him to come in to work to repair a malfunctioning mixer, King went
in to work intoxicated. King brought his dog with him and permitted the dog to
roam the dining room of the restaurant where King worked. He had been warned
about reporting to work intoxicated. Id. at 897.
268. Id. at 899. There is one exception to disqualification for unemployment com-
pensation. If an employee makes "consistent efforts" to maintain necessary treat-
ment, compensation is still available. See MINN. STAT. § 268.09, subd. 1(c)(2) (Supp.
1987). Total abstinence from substances or complete success of treatment is not
required. See Moeller v. Minnesota Dept. of Transportation, 281 N.W.2d 879, 882
(Minn. 1979); Leslin v. County of Hennepin, 347 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Minn. 1984).
269. See supra notes 61-62. See also Glide Lumber Products v. Employment Div., 86
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the Virginia Court of Appeals held that testing positive on a screen
did not prove that an employee reported to work under the influence
of marijuana.2 7' The Virginia and Minnesota courts have similarly
defined misconduct.272 Likewise, Oregon courts, interpreting mis-
conduct similarly to Minnesota courts, have allowed unemployment
claims for employees discharged for failing screens.
273
As Tilseth might indicate, when a screen reveals intoxicant use that
also violates laws and regulations relating to the employee's job, em-
ployee misconduct will be found. In Grinnell v. Board of Review of In-
dustrial Commission of Utah,274 the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
board of review decision denying a truck driver unemployment bene-
fits.275 After discovering that a speed governor on the truck had
been removed, and that in a twenty-four hour period the truck had
been driven for twenty-one hours and twenty-eight minutes, the em-
ployer required the employee to take a urinalysis screen.276 The
screen revealed marijuana use. 277 The court held that the discharge
was for misconduct and upheld the Board's decision to deny unem-
ployment benefits. 278
Not yet resolved is the question of whether an employee is entitled
to benefits when the employee quits a job rather than submit to a
screen.2 79 The Oregon Court of Appeals confronted, but did not
conclusively answer, that question in Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Em-
ployment Division.280 The hearing officer found that the required
screening program was an unreasonable condition of employment
Or. App. 669, 741 P.2d 907 (1987); Philomath Forest Products Co. v. Employment
Div., 86 Or. App. 678, 741 P.2d 912 (1987).
270. 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453 (1987).
271. Id. at 272, 356 S.E.2d at 455-56.
272. Compare supra note 264 with Blake, 4 Va. App. 270, 356 S.E.2d 453. The Blake
court found that:
[An employee is guilty of 'misconduct connected with his work' when he
deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legiti-
mate business interests of his employer, or when his acts or omissions are of
such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those inter-
ests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer.
Id. at 273, 356 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting Branch v. Virginia Employment Commission,
219 Va. 609, 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978)) (emphasis added).
273. Glide Lumber, 86 Or. App. 669, 675, 741 P.2d 907, 910 (positive test for mari-
juana); Philomath, 86 Or. App. 678, 680, 741 P.2d 912, 913 (positive test for mari-
juana); Silverton Forest Prods. v. Employment Div., 86 Or. App. 684, 741 P.2d 915
(1987) (positive test for amphetamine and cocaine).
274. 732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1987).
275. Id. at 115.
276. Id. at 114.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 115.
279. See infra notes 281-81 and accompanying text.
280. 87 Or. App. 152, 741 P.2d 904 (1987).
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and the employee was justified in quitting rather than submitting to
the screen.28 ' The court refused to hold that the screen was unrea-
sonable on its face and remanded for a factual inquiry into the rea-
sons why the employee quit rather than submit to the screen. 28 2
In view of screen imprecision, it seems unlikely Minnesota courts
will deny unemployment benefits to employees discharged for failing
a screen unless other questionable conduct is also involved.288
V. MINNESOTA STATUTE § 181.950: DRUG & ALCOHOL TESTING IN
THE WORKPLACE
Concerns about screening accuracy and employee privacy have
prompted commentators to propose legislation regulating employer
screening.284 Two such bills were introduced in the 1987 session of
the Minnesota Legislature.285 One was introduced by Representa-
tive Pappas and one by Senator Chmielewski.286 After the Pappas
bill passed the House,287 Representative Pappas and Senator Chmie-
lewski met and compromised on a version of the bill.288 The final
version of the bill was signed on June 3, 1987 by Governor
Perpich.289
281. Id. at 154, 741 P.2d at 905.
282. Id. at 156, 741 P.2d at 907.
283. See supra notes 254-68 and accompanying text. See also Glide, 87 Or. App. 152,
741 P.2d 904.
284. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 288-9 1.
285. S.F. 91, Reg. Sess., 1987 Minn. Leg. (Feb. 25, 1987 draft); H.F. 42, Reg.
Sess., 1987 Minn. Leg. (Mar. 2, 1987 draft). The intent of the legislation was to
protect individual privacy and to balance the rights of employees and employers.
The legislature finds that there exists a serious problem relating to test-
ing for substance abuse in the workplace. In reaction to a real concern
about drug and alcohol abuse, employers are increasingly using drug tests
to screen job applicants and employees. There are, however, serious con-
cerns about the accuracy of testing procedures and the privacy interest of
individuals. Therefore, the legislature is enacting sections 1 to 8 to balance
the rights of employers and employees and to ensure that, if the employers
use drug testing, the tests are as accurate as possible and limited to circum-
stances that threaten individual or public safety.
H.F. 42 § 1, 75th Legis., 1st Sess., Mar. 5, 1987 (authored by Rep. Pappas). The bills
attempted to solve two employee concerns, privacy and test accuracy, while allowing
employers to test individuals actually impaired on-the-job. See id. This section was
deleted from the final version of the bill.
286. See Floor Debate on H.F. 42 in the Minnesota House, 75th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess.,
Apr. 2, 1987 (audio tape); Floor Debate on H.F. 42 in the Minnesota House, 75th Minn.
Legis., 1st Sess., Apr. 3, 1987 (audio tape).
287. See Floor Debate on H.F. 42 in the Minnesota House, 75th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess.,
Apr. 2, 1987 (audio tape).
288. See Letter from Representative Pappas to Senator Chmielewski (May 16,
1987); Letter from Senator Chmielewski to Representative Pappas (May 16, 1987)
(affirming compromise) (on, file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
289. MINN. STAT. § 181.950-.956 (Supp. 1987).
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A. Process of Testing
The Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act 2 90 imposes
two pre-conditions on instituting a workplace screening program. 29 1
First, no program may be instituted unless it is done pursuant to a
written policy.292 Second, no program may test employees in an ar-
bitrary and capricious manner.293 The written testing policy must
set out: 1) which employees are subject to screening; 2) the circum-
stances under which screening will be instituted; 3) the right and
consequences of refusal of a screen; 4) the actions taken if a screen is
positive; 5) the employee's right to explain or contest a confirmatory
test; and, 6) any other appeal procedures available.294 Additionally,
employers must provide an individual employee with written notice
whenever that employee first becomes subject to the screening pro-
gram as well as posting general notice of the program in the
workplace.29 5
Although policy statements are not binding contracts under Pine
River State Bank v. Metille,2 96 the specificity required by the statute
virtually guarantees that employers will find their substance screen-
ing policies to be enforceable contracts. 29 7 Because the remedies
under the act are non-exclusive,298 an employer whose screening
program violates both the statute and the policy may be liable for
punitive damages, 2 99 contract damages,300 and also be ordered to
reinstate the employee with back pay. 30
290. Id.
291. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 1.
292. Id. at subd. 1(b).
293. Id. at subd. 1(c).
294. Id. at § 181.952, subd. l(l)-(6) (listing minimum information to be included
in employer's testing policy). The statutory requirements apply to job applicants as
well as employees. Id.
295. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 2.
296. 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983).
297. Id. at 626. See Hunt, 384 N.W.2d at 856-57. See also supra notes 137-41 and
accompanying text. The requirement that disciplinary processes and procedures be
included in the policy means that they will also be enforceable in contract actions. See
Hunt, 384 N.W.2d at 856-57. There are sound policy reasons behind this require-
ment. Part of the motivation for the legislation was to protect the rights of employ-
ees. See supra note 286. Requiring screening policies to be enforceable in contract
actions permits employees to know with certainty what their rights and responsibili-
ties are.
298. See § 181.956, subd. 2. "In addition to any other remedies provided by
law..." Id.
299. See id.
300. See supra notes 137-61 and accompanying text.
301. See § 181.956, subd. 4. "A court may, in its discretion, grant any other equi-
table relief it considers appropriate, including... reinstate[ment] with back pay." Id.
This approach is sound policy. Providing employees multiple remedies insures em-
ployers will not abuse their narrowly prescribed right to screen. It forces the em-
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An employer may screen employees only in certain situations. Job
applicants may be screened only when ajob has been offered and the
employer requires a substance test of all applicants for that posi-
tion.302 Current employees may be screened once a year as part of a
physical examination, if the employee has two weeks notice that a
screen will be part of the physical.303 Employers may also screen an
employee if they have reasonable suspicion that an employee: 1) is
under the influence of a substance; 2) has violated a work rule that
prohibits the use, possession, sale, or transfer of drugs on the em-
ployer's premises while operating the employer's machinery; 3) has
sustained or caused an injury; or, 4) has caused or been involved in a
work-related accident, or an accident involving machinery in the
workplace.3 04
Employers may screen on a random basis only those employees
whose position is "safety-sensitive."305 The definition of "safety-
sensitive" in the statute is almost sure to be a source of litigation. It
is so vague that virtually any employee could be said to be in a job
which is safety-sensitive.306 To qualify as a safety-sensitive position
an employer will have to be able to show a close nexus between the
duties of a job and a threat to health and safety.30 7
The employer may screen an employee who either has been in a
chemical dependency program covered by an employee benefit plan,
or has been referred to treatment by the employer within the
preceeding two years. 30 8 This provision is particularly onerous in
that, while conceding that the employee may have a problem with
chemical abuse, it provides that any failure in the rehabilitation pro-
gram can mean the loss of the employee's job.309 This seems to con-
ployer who elects to screen to confine the intrusion on employee privacy to narrow,
ascertainable parameters.
302. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 2. Additionally, if an applicant receives a job offer
conditional on passing a substance screen, the offer cannot be withdrawn based on a
positive unconfirmed test result. Id. at § 181.953, subd. 11.
303. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 3.
304. MINN. STAT. § 181.951, subd. 5.
305. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 4. "Safety-sensitive position means a job, including
any supervisory or management position, in which an impairment caused by drug or
alcohol usage would threaten the health or safety of any person." Id. at § 181.950,
subd. 13.
306. See id. See also George, Minnesota Opens Door to Employee Drug Testing, St. Paul
Pioneer Press Dispatch, Aug. 30, 1987, at 14, col. 2 (discussing criticism of the legis-
lation by Jack Mogelson, president of the political action arm of the Teamsters
Union).
307. See MINN. STAT. § 181.950, subd. 13.
308. Id. at § 181.951, subd. 6. In such a situation, the employer may request or
require testing without notice to the employee. Id.
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flict with the Human Rights Act's requirement of "reasonable
accomodations" for people with handicaps.310
Although an employer is under no duty to screen,3 1 once an em-
ployer decides to implement a screening program the statute pro-
vides a number of procedural requirements that must be followed in
executing the program. The major requirement is that the test re-
sults must be confirmed by a second test before any actions may be
taken against an employee.3 1 2 A second requirement is that an em-
ployer may not discharge an employee for a positive screen, even if
the screen is confirmed, unless the employee has been given an op-
portunity to participate in counseling or rehabilation. 3'
3
B. Regulation of Laboratories
A notable requirement of the statute is the licensing and regula-
tion of laboratories. 3 14 Additionally, employers are proscribed from
screening their own employees.315 The Department of Health is di-
rected to promulgate regulations governing standards for licensing,
samples appropriate for screening, methods of analysis, chain-of-cus-
tody procedures, threshold detection levels, and licensing fees.316 In
the interim, an employer may use a nonlicensed testing laboratory,
but the statute prescribes education for the laboratory director, pro-
ficiency standards, acceptable samples for screening, methods of
analysis, chain-of-custody procedures, and certification of confirma-
tory tests.3 1 7
310. See D'Aquila, supra note 173, at 267.
311. MINN. STAT. § 181.951, subd. 7. This relieves the employer of Ponticas-type
liability as it relates to screening. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
312. MINN. STAT. § 181.953, subd. 10(a) (prohibited employer actions include dis-
charge, discipline, discrimination and request or requirement of rehabilitation).
313. Id. at § 181.953, subd. 10(b)(1)-(2). The opportunity for counseling or reha-
bilitation is statutorily required only when the positive confirmatory test result which
precipitates employer action is the first such result for the employee. Id. at subd.
10(b). If the counseling or rehabilitation is not covered by the employee's benefit
plan, the employee who chooses treatment is financially responsible for the cost. Id.
at subd. 10(b)(1). Employer action may then be taken upon the refusal to participate
in treatment, the withdrawal or failure to complete the program, or the occurrence of
a positive confirmatory test result after completion of the treatment program. Id. at
subd. 10(b)(2).
An employer may temporarily suspend the employee or transfer the employee to
a different position without change in salary, however, pending the outcome of the
confirmatory test if it is reasonably necessary to protect the safety of others. Id. at
subd. 10(c). Reinstatement with back pay is mandatory if the confirmatory test, or a
requested retest, is negative. Id.
314. Id. at § 181.953, subd. 1.
315. Id. at subd. 4.
316. Id.
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C. Protection of Privacy
Employee privacy is protected in a number of ways. Laboratories
cannot release any information obtained in a screen to an employer
other than "the presence or absence of drugs, alcohol, or their me-
tabolites."318 Unless needed in an arbitration, an administrative
hearing, or in litigation, screen results may not be released without
the permission of the employee.319 The statute also provides a cause
of action for employees harmed by the violation of the statutory re-
quirements by either an employer or a laboratory.320
D. Remaining Problems
The legislation goes a long way toward resolving some of the
problems in workplace substance screening. The statute sets out a
framework that employers and employees can rely on to determine
their rights and responsibilities. The statute is not a panacea for the
problem of substance abuse. Neither is it a cure for the problems in
substance screening programs.
Unfortunately, the statute perpetuates the assumption that an em-
ployee is guilty of substance use until proven innocent.321 After an
employee's sample has tested positive in a confirmatory test, if the
employee wishes to challenge the screen the employee must pay the
cost of a re-test.3 2 2 Implicit in this section is a belief that the chain-
of-custody procedures323 will eliminate handling errors.3 24 Requir-
ing employees to pay the costs of re-testing places the burden of
proof on the employee. When an employer has taken the deliberate
action to invade an employee's privacy, the employer should bear
both the burden of proof and the costs of the employee's exonera-
318. Id. at § 181.954, subd. 1.
319. Id. at subd. 2-3(1). Other exceptions to confidentiality include when results
are needed by treatment facilities for evaluation or treatment of the employee, and
when disclosure is pursuant to federal laws, regulations or orders. Id. at subd. 3(2)-
(3).
320. Id. at § 181.956. Under the statutory cause of action, the violation must have
occured knowingly or recklessly. Id. at subd. 2. Injunctive relief is available as are
appropriate equitable remedies beyond money damages. Id. at subd. 3-4. Finally,
the statute provides a cause of action in addition to any other remedies available by
law. Id. at subd. 2.
321. See id. § 181.952, subd. 1(5). To many critics, screening is offensive because
it forces employees to prove they are not guilty of substance use. See Note, supra note
13, at 276.
322. MINN. STAT. § 181.953, subd. 6. The employee is also permitted to explain
the test result.
323. Id. at subd. 5.
324. Compare id. at subds. 5-6 with supra note 71 (enumerating handling error
problems). A shortcoming of the statute is its failure to provide a mechanism for
protests of handling procedures that do not conform to the statute's requirements,
short of litigation. See supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
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tion attempt.3 2 5
Similarly, the employer attempting to terminate an employee
should not only have to offer rehabilitation, but also pay for its costs.
Employers are not required to pay for an employee's rehabilitation
unless there is coverage under an employee benefit plan.3 26 Given
that substance abuse is treated and treatable as a disease,327 employ-
ers should have to bear that burden. Otherwise the problem is only
shifted to the next employer.3 2 8
Another remaining problem relates to a screen's inability to detect
on-the-job substance use.329 Except in "reasonable suspicion test-
ing"3 3 0 an employer does not need to show a connection between an
employee's work behavior and a desire to screen the employee.331
This problem could be dealt with by a legislative revision narrowing
the definition of a safety sensitive position.332
Probably the largest defect in the statute is its method of dealing
with an employee whose test is confirmed positive.333 There is no
room for an employee to relapse.3 3 4 In light of an employer's right
under the statute to move an employee to a position which is not
safety sensitive, this provision is, at best, harsh.335 There is no re-
quirement that the second test be motivated by on-the-job behav-
ior.336 The statute should be modified to provide the employee who
completes a rehabilitation program, and whose screens are subse-
quently substance free for two years, a clean slate. Ideally, there
should be some sort of sunset provision under which a positive
screen result would be removed from an employee's record after a
period of time. As the statute is now written, positive results thirty
years apart could result in employee termination.33 7
325. Gambel & Zeese, supra note 12, at 37.
326. MINN. STAT. § 181.953, subd. 10(b)(2).
327. Bensinger, supra note 26, at 20.
328. See Hoffer, supra note 45, at 58.
329. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
330. See MINN. STAT. § 181.951, subd. 5. Reasonable suspicion will exist only
where an employer has cause to believe an employee is under the influence of a sub-
stance on the job or where an employee is involved in a work-related accident. Id.
331. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text. In narrowly circumscribed
testing of safety sensitive employees, the employer can argue that the cause of testing
is related to the fear of error by an intoxicated employee.
332. See MINN. STAT. § 181.950, subd. 13.
333. See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text. See also D'Aquila, supra note
173.
334. MINN. STAT. § 181.951, subd. 6 allows an employer to require an employee
who is referred to a treatment program to be randomly tested for two years following
completion of the program. Section 181.953, subdivision 10(b)(2) allows an em-
ployer to discharge an employee who tests positive during this period.
335. MINN. STAT. § 181.953, subd. 10(c).
336. See supra note 308.
337. See MINN. STAT. § 181.953, subd. 10(b).
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VI. GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING
Employers are legitimately concerned about the use of intoxicants
in the workplace.338 Employee concerns about privacy also have a
legitimate basis.339 Both employers and employees have an interest
in the accuracy of screening programs. An employer who contem-
plates substance screening of employees must be aware that em-
ployee substance abuse is a complex and difficult problem and that
substance screening is no panacea. 340
Employers, prior to instituting a screening program, must care-
fully weigh the reasons for screening, balancing anticipated gains
against potential liabilities. To do so, employers must first educate
themselves about the substance abuse problem. As a part of this ed-
ucation process, the employer must ascertain the applicable law.
Only after completion of this education process should a screening
program be formulated. Each business will have characteristics that
require tailoring of the program to fit its needs.341
Prior to the actual institution of a program, an employer should
determine what action will be taken as a result of a "positive" screen
result. 342 Clearly, an employee cannot be discharged with impunity
solely for a positive screen.3 43 A decision will have to be made
whether to institute an employee assistance program. An in-house
employee assistance program may not be practical for small
employers.344
Rules relating to on-the-job use of intoxicants and the conse-
quences of on-the-job impairment should be widely disseminated to
employees.345 Training of managers and supervisors should be
done to appraise them of the rules and teach them how to recognize
employees with potential abuse problems.346
There are a number of "nevers:"
1) Never screen without good reason to believe there is a com-
pany-wide substance abuse problem;
338. See supra notes 25-61 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. See generally Westin, Science, Pri-
vacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, Part 1, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003
(1966); Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues for the 1970's, Part 11, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 1205 (1966) (arguing that there should be great concern about the invasions of
privacy made possible through developing technology).
340. Rothstein, supra note 76, at 435.
341. Id.; Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 24, at 419; Geidt, supra note 14, at 200-
03.
342. See Rothstein, supra note 76, at 435.
343. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
344. See Rothstein, supra note 76, at 434-35 (discussing the costs to employers of
employee assistance programs).
345. Bensinger, supra note 26, at 22.
346. Rothstein, supra note 70, at 434.
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2) Never screen without reasonable suspicion;
3) Never design a screening program to force employees to
give samples in front of another individual;
4) Never allow careless sample handling to occur;
5) Never take action against an employee on the basis of un-
confirmed screen results;
6) Never assume an employee is an alcoholic or an addict on
the basis of a screen result;
7) Never communicate the results of a screen to anyone with-
out the employee's permission, except on a need to know
basis;
8) Never, under the guise of a substance screen, perform medi-
cal tests designed to reveal information about an employee
other than that which directly relates to substance use; and
9) Never hire a screening service or laboratory without check-
ing the laboratory's credentials and at least considering lia-
bility insurance or indemnification in any employment
dispute arising out of a screen result.
Employers should be aware that screening has liability costs as well
as administrative costs, and may be an expensive risk, especially for
small businesses. The rewards are unproven and the screens can be
unreliable.
CONCLUSION
Employers are justifiably concerned about the problem of sub-
stance abuse in the workplace. The rush to use urinalysis substance
screening as a cure ignores the fact that substance abuse is a deeply
rooted and complex problem. Urinalysis substance screens, used
properly, can be an effective tool in the elimination of substance use
in the workplace. Used improperly, screens can subject employers to
liability.
Employees have an interest in protecting their privacy, jobs, and
reputations from unwarranted accusations of chemical dependency.
Urinalysis substance screens are subject to inaccuracies and may be
an invasion of privacy.
The growing urinalysis screen industry has been completely un-
regulated. There has been no conformity in standards of sample
handling, test procedures, or training requirements for technicians.
These factors, together with the rapid growth of test utilization,
could lead to an increased likelihood of inaccurate results.
The new Minnesota statute will go a long way towards clarifying
the relative rights of employers and employees. The statute will in-
crease confidence in the accuracy of screen results by regulating the
screening industry. The legislation does not, however, make urinal-
ysis substance screening a panacea for the complex problem of sub-
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stance abuse in society. Therefore, any employer's course of action
in dealing with substance abuse in the workplace should be deliber-
ate and well considered.
Victor H. Smith
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